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TRANSFORMATION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE BUSINESS 
MANAGEMENT: 
CURRENT INITIATIVES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES  
 




The major transformational challenge facing DOD in the period 2005-2008 is how to 
continue to re-capitalize and modernize the fighting forces while also pushing the pace 
of business transformation to increase efficiency. This must be accomplished while 
continuing to pay the high price of waging the war on terrorism. In essence, what DOD 
must fund and support in the short-term must be traded-off against longer-term 
investments to improve efficiency and force readiness. In this context, significant 
business management transformation challenges include:  
 
1. How will DOD business transformation keep pace and be coordinated with 
the transformation of military affairs under conditions of limited resources?  
2. How will DOD re-capitalize the force structure within limited budgets? 
3. How can DOD acquisition and procurement incorporate new technologies 
while producing and fielding war fighting and support assets more quickly, 
especially given tight budgets in the foreseeable future? 
4. How will new cyber-management technologies and methods (e.g., net-centric 
warfare systems) be advanced within the limits of resource constraints? 
5. How will DOD manage the transition of logistics support (e.g., toward spiral 
logistics) to the new environment of the war on terrorism? 
6. How will DOD improve its accounting and financial management systems to 
enable analysis of performance and results related to costs, and provide more 
accurate, reliable and timely information of better ‘decision-quality’ for 
DOD leaders?  
 
This paper describes and analyzes defense business management transformation 
initiatives proposed and implemented under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 
the past three and one-half years. Transformation is defined through reference to 
DOD's own definition and recent transformation initiatives are reviewed including 
those in the areas of financial management, human resource management, and 
acquisition. In this context, the history of DOD requests for increased delegation of 
authority from Congress to pursue transformational change is assessed. Next, the paper 
addresses the recent transformation of the central resource planning and decision 
system used by DOD, now referred to as the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, 
Execution System (PPBES). Following this it investigates performance measurement 
and management, initiatives now in progress as part of the transformation in business 
affairs across the federal government and in DOD. Finally, it identifies some of the 
transformation challenges that must be addressed by defense business management 
decision makers in the next four years. As noted in the conclusions, leveraging 
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information technology innovation is a key element of transformation. Network centric 
combat information systems are under development in all of the military services. Such 
systems coordinate various types of data to a single command point in real time to 
improve the ability to see and manage military operations. Applications of network 
centric IT in the area of business management may be the next step, although it is 
costly. However, it is one approach to coordination of decision making in flatter, 
network types of organization rather than through traditional bureaucratic forms of 
organizing to solve complex and sometimes "wicked" problems of the type faced in 
national defense. Given the vital importance of information technology it is essential for 
DOD to address the knowledge, skills and abilities of its workforce to fully leverage the 
potential of IT and other business management methods. Virtually all DOD 
transformation is modeled on smart practice in the private sector. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Transformation of the Department of Defense may best be understood in the context of 
reform of the federal government to introduce more efficient business management 
practices, improve financial and accounting procedures and systems, improve strategic 
planning and budgeting, and to manage more directly for performance and results. As 
explained subsequently, a considerable degree of transformational reform is under 
implementation in the Department of Defense. This paper attempts to explain the 
direction of management reform for defense that must be linked to support the 
transformation of forces on the military side of the Department of Defense with the 
understanding that all policy, organizational and resource process changes eventually 
have an impact on defense budgets and management. Additionally, the paper points out 
challenges to defense policy makers in implementing transformational changes in 
progress and those that may be anticipated as needed in the future. The first section of 
this paper describes and analyzes defense business management transformation 
initiatives proposed and implemented under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 
the past three and one-half years. In this context the paper assesses the history of DOD 
requests from Congress for increased delegation of authority to implement reform. 
Next, it addresses the recent transformation of the central resource planning and 
decision system used by DOD, now referred to as the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, Execution System (PPBES). Following this it investigates performance 
measurement and management initiatives now in progress as part of the transformation 
in business affairs across the federal government and in DOD. Finally, conclusions 
highlight additional transformation initiatives in progress and define some of the key 
challenges that need to be addressed by defense business management decision makers 
in the next four years. 
 
WHAT IS TRANSFORMATION? 
This paper focuses on the business side of DOD transformation and not on the 
transformation of the fighting forces. However, the premise throughout is that business 
management transformation must track, support and keep pace with the changes in the 
force structure and the needs of the fighting forces to respond to the threats posed in the 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 6     Issue 2  ·   2005  ·  © International Public Management Network 
11 
 
national security environment. One of the greatest challenges for leaders pursuing 
reform of defense management systems is convincing the warfighter that the cost of 
failing to invest in reform efforts is greater than the initial opportunity costs of such 
investments. This subject will be discussed in more detail subsequently in this paper.  
The business transformation initiatives of the Bush administration should be viewed 
as a continuation, albeit at an accelerated pace, of many of the recommendations for 
federal government reform recommended by the Packard and Grace Commissions in the 
1980s, and of the very ambitious changes in business practices instituted under the 
Defense Management Report/Review (DMR) under Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney 
and his staff including Deputy Secretary Donald Atwood, Comptroller Sean O'Keefe 
and Deputy Comptroller Donald Shycoff (Jones and Bixler, 1992; Thompson and Jones, 
1994). Many of the DMR initiatives and programs were continued with success under 
Secretaries Aspin, Perry and Cohen during the Clinton administration, under the 
direction for part of this time of DOD Comptroller John Hamre and Under Secretaries 
of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Paul Kaminsky and Jacques Gansler among 
others. Some programs such as the Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) were 
discontinued when control of working capital funds were transferred from the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense back to the military departments and services from which they 
were consolidated under the Office of the Secretary of Defense by Shycoff. However, 
many DMR and related initiatives have transcended three Presidential administrations 
and have improved the efficiency of defense business management, e.g., the 
consolidated Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). Indeed, it is possible to 
trace the origins of defense business transformation back to the 1960s under the 
leadership of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and DOD Comptroller Charles 
Hitch as detailed later in this paper. And, of course, realignment of the defense 
department after WW II under the Key West Accord laid the groundwork for significant 
reform over the next half century and longer, most of this under the pressure of the Cold 
War against the USSR. The competition for command of U.S. nuclear forces in the 
1960s, passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, the end of the Cold War in 1989 
are the only other events that have shaped the change of the Department of Defense 
(DOD) as significantly. 
One observation of many that may be made about the succession of reforms in the 
Department of Defense is that comptrollers have been key players in implementation for 
decades. This is in part because of the simple fact that change requires money and 
authority, and DOD comptrollers control the former (as long as they make their peace 
with key congressional budget process participants) and have been given considerable 
latitude of the latter under most Presidential administrations. However, one may wonder 
whether DOD comptrollers are best suited to the task of business transformation given 
that they have plenty of other responsibilities managing the financial affairs of DOD. In 
this light, might transformation be better directed and orchestrated under a position of 
Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management or a similar title. We return to this issue 
subsequently, but it is important to note that such proposals have been advanced within 
DOD by those who have participated in numerous management reform programs across 
the years and by advisors to Congress. (GAO, 2004) 
With respect to the continuing need for transformation throughout DOD, hastened 
by the attacks of 9/11/2001 and the demands of fighting the war on terrorism, Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has explained, "We're likely to face fewer large armies, 
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navies and air forces, and instead more adversaries who hide in lawless, ungoverned 
areas and attack without warning in unconventional ways. Our challenge is not 
conventional, it's unconventional." (Rumsfeld as cited by OFT, 2004) Recently, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz approved the 2004 DOD Training Transformation 
Implementation Plan (IP) to better enable joint operations. This replaces the 2003 plan 
as a result of the department's experience in transforming the force and from lessons 
learned during operations in the Global War on Terrorism. (OFT, 2004) 
Given the demands of the war on terrorism, Rumsfeld's comment identifies the 
essential dilemma facing DOD in recruiting, training and equipping the fighting force 
under a different doctrine of war. Transformation of business affairs in DOD has to 
support the transformation of the fighting forces. 
Given this reality, how may defense business transformation be defined? According 
to Arthur K. Cebrowski (Vice Admiral, USN ret.), Director of the Office of Force 
Transformation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, transformation may be 
defined in the following way. The mission of OFT is to stimulate transformation 
initiatives throughout the Department of Defense. This statement is taken verbatim from 
the OFT website (OFT, 2004). 
There are many different definitions being bantered about in government, in 
Congress and in the public over what specifically does transformation mean? What is it 
really all about? What is the process for getting there? Some say it is about injecting 
new technology into the military. Others believe transformation is about new ways of 
buying weapon systems. Still others hold that transformation is about the wholesale 
change of organizations. Many say the term has been so overused that it has lost 
significant meaning and it is simply now the status quo in government and especially 
DOD. Frankly, we don’t care which definition is used so long as any transformation 
process contains certain key, immutable elements. Transformation is foremost a 
continuing process. It does not have an end point. Transformation is meant to create or 
anticipate the future. Transformation is meant to deal with the co-evolution of concepts, 
processes, organizations and technology. Change in any one of these areas necessitates 
change in all. Transformation is meant to create new competitive areas and new 
competencies. Transformation is meant to identify, leverage and even create new 
underlying principles for the way things are done. Transformation is meant to identify 
and leverage new sources of power. One aspect of transformation that appears 
indisputable to most if not all DOD leaders as reformers and change advocates is that 
organizational culture is something that must necessarily be addressed, and carefully 
managed, if transformational change efforts are to prove successful. The overall 
objective of these changes is simply—sustained American competitive advantage in 
warfare. 
One lens that might prove helpful in understanding transformation is through that of 
a commercial corporate strategy for innovation. While there are obvious and 
fundamental differences between corporations and the Department of Defense, 
nevertheless certain basic elements are germane to both types of organizations. Any 
good corporate innovation strategy, according to Eric Beinhocker, at MIT’s Sloan 
School of Management, has three distinct parts. 
 
Focus on Core Missions—This is the bread and butter of any organization and the 
main point of any corporate effort. This is where modernization, recapitalization, and 
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taking care of the capital plant occur. This is basic stuff. This is the realm of 
evolutionary changes where an organization simply tries to get better at what it is 
already doing. It should be emphasized that transformation and modernization are not in 
competition. They are different things and any organization must undertake both 
processes to be successful. 
 
A Series of Small Exploratory Jumps—This is where an organization pushes out the 
boundaries of a core competency and tries to create something new. Changes in this 
category are within the existing paradigm. An example of this is the U.S. Navy pursuing 
unmanned underwater vehicles for shallow water mine hunting and antisubmarine 
warfare. Those missions are already core competencies for the Navy. But, insofar as 
using this technology in new ways makes it possible to do something that Navy could 
not do before; it is transformational. Note that this change will involve doctrine and 
organization as well as technology. Another example related to transformation of DOD 
business systems is what has historically been the most common practice; integrating 
existing systems that previously could not share data for which there is a common need. 
Although this may seem transformational to the system users because it, at least in 
theory, reduces or eliminates the need for manual system entries, it most often results in 
maintaining the unreliable and costly legacy systems that are in such great need of 
replacement. 
 
Placing a Few Big Bets—These are big jumps. These are the things that will change a 
military service, change the Department of Defense and maybe even change the world. 
Some might argue that this is not what the DOD does, but they are wrong because the 
organization has already done this in the past. Global Positioning System satellites are a 
prime example. Its advent changed the military, changed the department and changed 
civil society. Another is the American military’s ability, led by the U.S. Army, to “own 
the night.” It changed the character of land warfare. That was a big bet. Yet another 
example is putting nuclear ballistic missiles to sea in submarines. 
The problem with these examples is they are rearward looking. The question is what 
is a possible big bet for today? There are a few examples that spring forward, but the 
department must still see how these play out after they are assessed and experimented 
with by the active forces. One is the transition to speed of light weapons. The 
development of such weapons could change the relationship between offense and 
defense. 
Space is another area where a new business strategy combining new technology 
with new operational concepts can have profound impact on how information energy 
can be applied on the battlefield. This may involve capabilities to generate very small 
payloads, very quickly on orbit. Robotics is another avenue that could prove fruitful, 
since relocating the human on the battlefield could change everything. 
An example related to DOD business systems is Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) systems. Although there are clearly examples of failed ERP initiatives in both the 
public and private sectors, there is great support throughout the government and within 
DOD for reducing what some say may be as many as 5,000 systems to several ERP 
systems, or taken to the extreme even one large system, that use more advanced 
technology and share common data. With the investment required for such ‘big bets’ in 
technology it is argued that the return on investment would be quick and substantial. 
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Transformation is not an impossible task. Given the leadership and support from 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and the service secretaries and military chiefs of staff, 
significant progress is being made. When you have that kind of support and 
commitment it is truly amazing what can be accomplished." (Cebrowski, 2004) 
 
THE DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION ACT INITIATIVE 
Although only part of the Defense Transformation legislation detailed in this section 
was adopted by Congress, and given that the proposal had some flaws, to grasp how 
DOD has characterized the need for transformation in its business practices, We draw 
on the statement supporting the enactment of the Defense Transformation Act for the 
21st Century (DTA) delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to the 
House Government Reform Committee on May 6, 2003 (Wolfowitz, 2003). Wolfowitz 
indicated the desire of the Bush administration and Secretary Rumsfeld to continue to 
implement broad management, financial and budgetary reform in DOD. Subsequent to 
this presentation, Congress passed significant portions of the DTA as part of the 
Defense Authorization Act of 2003, but was reluctant to give DOD certain broad 
discretionary powers that it had sought in certain areas. 
The Defense Transformation Act for the 21st Century represents comprehensive 
reform to address serious problems in DOD management systems. The Act was 
intended to provide the military departments and services greater flexibility to respond 
effectively to changing threats and the ability to move resources more rapidly, and to 
put new weapons systems in the field more quickly. The Act includes more flexible 
rules for managing the flow of money and personnel in DOD to facilitate response to 
threat requirements. Prior to submission of DTA to Congress in final form on April 10, 
2003 in the months leading up to its formal delivery, DOD convened more than 100 
meetings with members and staff to develop and debate its various provisions. 
The provisions of the DTA approved by Congress in the Defense Authorization Act 
of 2003 are highly detailed and only a summary of the changes requested and 
authorized is provided here. The DTA as passed by Congress includes authority for 
DOD to create a new personnel system for all DOD civilian employees and to move 
some non-military functions assigned to DOD over the years to other, more appropriate 
departments. The DTA authorizes elimination of regulations that make it difficult for 
small firms to do business with DOD. It includes expanded authority for competitive 
outsourcing to move military personnel out of non-military jobs. It also included several 
measures to preserve military training ranges necessary to assure force readiness.  
 
Wolfowitz cited the following problems that required transformational reform: 
 
• Inability to put civilians into hundreds of thousands of jobs that do not need to 
be performed by military personnel places great stress on uniformed personnel 
and their availability for combat duty. Approximately 320,000 uniformed 
personnel perform essentially non-military jobs in DOD, but DOD has had to 
call up Reserve forces to serve in the war on terrorism. 
• Inefficiency in DOD management systems means that taxpayers are not getting 
best value from their defense dollars. Further, military forces are not well 
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supported. For example, despite 128 acquisition reform studies, DOD operates 
an acquisition system that since 1975 has doubled the time needed to produce a 
new weapons system in an era when technologies in the private sector are 
arriving in years and months rather than decades. 
• Encroachment of the ability of military forces to train adequately in an era when 
training represents the most important edge the U.S. military has over real and 
potential adversaries. Curtailment of the capacity to train adequately threatens 
military capability.  
• Limited flexibility to manage the DOD civilian work force makes it difficult to 
compete with the private sector for the specialized skills that an information-age 
military needs for support. 
• Inability to push new ideas through cumbersome DOD acquisition management 
processes means that the equipment the military uses in the field now is a 
generation or two or more behind feasible technology. In both Afghanistan and 
Iraq, qualitative weapons system superiority saved lives, but far more could have 
been the done with better technology. The need is great for the U.S. military to 
respond better and more rapidly to defeat interests that threaten the security of 
the United States. In this regard Wolfowitz said, “Our objective is not merely to 
achieve victories, but to have the kind of decisive superiority that can help us to 
prevent wars in the first place, or if they must be fought, that can enable us to 
win as quickly as possible with as little loss of life as possible.” (Wolfowitz, 
2003: 2-3) 
 
Wolfowitz cited the fact that DOD was already engaged in substantial 
transformation that included reducing management and headquarters staffs by 11 
percent. The acquisition process had eliminated hundreds of pages of unnecessary rules 
and DOD regulations. In addition, a new financial management structure was under 
implementation to integrate all DOD financial systems into a single system. He added: 
 
But these internal changes are not enough. DOD needs legislative relief to …help 
transform how we manage people, how we buy weapons and how we manage our 
training range…One of the key areas…is in transforming our system of personnel 
management so that we can gain more flexibility and agility in how we handle the more 
than 700,000 civilians who provide the Department such vital support -- or to deal 
efficiently with those who don’t. The ability to do so is nothing less than a national 
security requirement because it goes straight to how well we will be able to defend our 
country in the years to come… In truth, this is neither a new nor a partisan issue. No 
less than three administrations have tried to fix a system that is, by most accounts, 
seriously broken. In an age when terrorists move information at the speed of an e-mail, 
money at the speed of a wire transfer and people at the speed of a commercial jet liner, 
the Defense Department is still bogged down, to a great extent, in the micro-
management and bureaucratic processes of the industrial age, when the world has 
surged ahead into the information age. (Wolfowitz, 2003: 1) 
 
To illustrate his points with respect to personnel administration Wolfowitz cited the 
example of the Defense Information Systems Agency that found it difficult to recruit 
candidates critical to doing business in the information age, e.g., in telecommunications, 
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information technology and professional engineering and science. This was because 
federal and DOD employment and recruitment rules are inflexible and time-consuming. 
Industry offers the best and brightest candidates jobs on the spot at job fairs, while DOD 
must compete for these same individuals using a hiring process that requires months to 
navigate.  Equally reprehensible, this same system that is slow in hiring talent is equally 
slow to unload people with proven problems. In one case the Defense Logistics Agency 
took nine months to fire an employee with previous suspensions and corrective actions 
who was found repeatedly sleeping on the job. 
Wolfowitz explained that in other federal government agencies major portions of the 
workforce had already been “…freed from archaic rules and regulations.” (Wolfowitz, 
2003: 4) He explained:  
 
We realize that achieving the goal of reforming the Defense Department’s civil service 
system requires some bold moves to constitute real transformation. We are asking you 
now to help us take such a bold step. That we are fighting a difficult war on terrorism 
that promises to be of some duration only makes the need to reform our personnel 
system even more pressing. We must fix this system now. We cannot afford to wait. 
(Wolfowitz, 2003: 4) 
 
In support of the DTA, Secretary Rumsfeld made a plea for greater delegation of 
authority and freedom from micromanagement from Congress (Rumsfeld, 2003: 35). 
Rumsfeld noted that: 
 
• The defense authorization bill had grown from only one page in 1962 to a 
“whopping” 534 pages in 2001. 
 
• DOD is required to prepare and submit some 26,000 pages of justification and 
more than 800 required reports to Congress each year -- many of marginal value, 
most probably not read. Since 1975, the time it takes to produce a new weapons 
system has doubled, even as new technologies are arriving in years and months, 
not decades. (Rumsfeld, 2003: 35) 
 
THE QUEST FOR INCREASED DELEGATION  
OF AUTHORITY FOR TRANSFORMATION 
The possibility of obtaining increased delegation of authority from Congress to DOD 
has captivated defense budget analysts and reformers since the late 1960s. Prior to the 
1960s the defense program and budget was approved in a far less controversial manner 
than the way the process has operated since “hawks” and “doves” began a protracted 
battle in the halls of Congress over the Vietnam war. Objections to the Vietnam War 
and the spending plans of President Lyndon Johnson caused an increase in 
congressional authorization and appropriation detail and specificity, and greater budget 
execution oversight. The need for more managerial flexibility and delegation of 
authority from Congress in budget execution has been supported by critics of 
congressional defense budgeting and management for decades (Jones and Bixler, 1992; 
Gansler, 1989; Fox, 1988; Kanter, 1983, Augustine, 1982; Luttwak, 1982).  
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Delegation of budget execution authority is an important issue because it is highly 
relevant to (a) the assessment of defense budget process reform, (b) analysis of 
proposals to reformulate defense priorities, and (c) changes in defense spending. This 
fact has not been lost on DOD leadership. For example, former Defense Secretary Frank 
Carlucci asked Congress for increased managerial powers at the end of the Reagan 
administration in 1988. Former Defense Secretary Dick Cheney proposed six 
acquisition programs in the 1991-1994 time frame for execution without congressional 
oversight as a test of the DOD ability to operate efficiently independent of external 
micromanagement. Congress did not approve this request (Jones and Bixler, 1992).  
Some elements of the change proposed in the DTA in the acquisition area were 
designed to formalize procedures preferred and already practiced by Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld. One such change was to bring decisions on major 
acquisition buys up to The Secretary of Defense more quickly, before final decision 
were, in effect, already made elsewhere in the Pentagon. This change was proposed in 
the DTA to allow any The Secretary of Defense to make such decision outside of the 
formal PPBES and acquisition cycle processes. Obviously, this might be an advantage 
as long as the Secretary of Defense wished to make such decisions, and were good at it. 
This approach appealed to the centralized decision making style of Donald Rumsfeld.   
For example, cancellation of the Army Crusader heavy-artillery system is an 
example of a transformation decision Secretary Rumsfeld made and won out on over 
institutional opposition, but it was a close-run struggle. If all major acquisition 
negotiations are this hard, and there is no reason to expect them to be easier, then such 
successes for future Secretaries of Defense will have their price and will be few in 
number. Just as with any strong leader, Secretary Rumsfeld made enemies within the 
defense establishment by this decision, in the Pentagon and Congress and in industry. 
Not everyone wants to be transformed.  
Secretary Rumsfeld took it upon himself to fix a number of problems with DOD 
management including changing the acquisition process so that weapons buys could be 
decided upon and weapons fielded more quickly; to fix the planning and strategy focus 
from geography to capabilities; to repair inter-service gaps in function and performance 
so that the military services might interact more smoothly. This transformation was 
accomplished by strengthening the decision making authority of theOffice of the 
Secretary of Defense relative to the power of the military departments and services, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and other DOD entities, and by holding the reins of power tightly 
himself. However, winning wars, military or bureaucratic, requires soldiers as well as 
leaders. In a speech to the Naval War College in January 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld 
commented that nothing was more important to the success of his transformational 
reforms than the people who would be appointed to leadership positions in the next 
couple of years in the Pentagon (Rumsfeld, 2002). This did not play out smoothly in 
2003 as Rumsfeld clashed with Army leaders over transformation issues (Schlesinger, 
2003: 1). In short, all of this indicates the relationship between style and substance in 
management reform. More on this issue is provided subsequently in this paper. 
With respect to the battle to enact the DTA, prior to a vote in the House of 
Representatives on the Defense Transformation Act (as part of the Defense 
Authorization Act of 2003), in May 2003 a letter criticizing the proposed initiative was 
sent to Speaker of the House Rep. Dennis Hastert (R-IL) from the ranking members 
(Democrats) of two important budget committees of the House, Rep. David Obey (WI) 
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of the Appropriation Committee, and Rep. John Spratt (SC) of the Budget Committee 
(Obey and Spratt, 2003). The letter illustrates the parameters of the debate on the DTA. 
The authors argued that the changes requested by DOD in the Defense Transformation 
Act would impede the ability of Congress to perform the oversight responsibilities 
vested in it by the Constitution in Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7, “No money shall be 
drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a 
regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall 
be published from time to time.” (Obey and Spratt, 2003: 2) The letter admitted there 
were weaknesses in federal personnel practices, but opposed the changes requested by 
DOD because no new DOD system had been brought forward for review and the grant 
of authority requested would leave the Secretary of Defense free to rewrite the rules 
governing 700,000 DOD civilian employees with, “…absolutely no consultation with 
Congress.” (Obey and Spratt, 2003: 4)  
The DTA also proposed eliminating 100 reports to Congress and proposed 
eliminating the remaining reporting requirements after five years. In the acquisition 
area, the Selected Acquisition Reports would no longer be provided Congress. The 
Obey-Spratt letter argued these were critical to Congress and its agent GAO obtaining 
information to discharge its oversight responsibilities. In particular, they indicated that 
the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) provided information about cost overruns, 
technical failures and schedule delays in weapons development. The authors argued that 
the DTA as proposed resulted in an “…unprecedented reduction in congressional 
oversight and accountability, and in some cases unlimited increases in the powers of the 
Secretary of Defense.” (Obey and Spratt, 2003: 2)  
In conclusion, Representatives Obey and Spratt asked why Congress should, 
“…rush to overhaul an organization that has yet again demonstrated its ability to 
perform to the highest standards on the battlefield.” (Obey and Spratt, 2003: 12) While 
Republicans generally supported the Wolfowitz DTA proposal, the argument went 
beyond party lines as serious questions were raised about the potential of the reforms to 
endanger congressional ability to fulfill its constitutionally mandated oversight role. 
History indicates that Congress moves slowly, or not at all, in delegating its 
prerogatives with respect to defense. However, in one major area Congress was willing 
to authorize DOD to completely transform its civilian personnel system as explained 
subsequently.  
It may be noted that many of the defense transformation reforms proposed and some 
implemented in the early 2000s do not require congressional approval, unless Congress 
specifically deems otherwise, e.g., members can call for ad hoc or standing committees 
to hold hearings on virtually any topic as they please. In the past, most changes in PPBS 
have been accomplished without explicit congressional approval.  However, in some 
cases DOD initiatives have been quashed quickly, e.g., DOD Comptroller Robert 
Anthony’s Project Prime in the 1960s (Jones and Thompson, 1999; Jones, 2001). 
Alteration of the PPBE system in 2001-2003 from a linear decision profile to one that is 
clearly linked to the Presidential electoral cycle did not require congressional approval. 
PPBES is a DOD internal resource management system and traditionally DOD has been 
free to restructure it as desired.  
Because the 2001-2003 PPBES reforms were made without explicit congressional 
approval, we may ask what this means with respect to the desirability of further 
delegation of authority from Congress to DOD. From my view, the PPBES cycle timing 
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changes were sensible given that new administrations rarely have the people in place or 
the insights necessary to put programs in place and prepare budget initiatives in the first 
year (the administration of Ronald Reagan is a notable exception). Thus, designating the 
first year for review of national security strategy and the work on the Quadrennial 
Defense Review sets the scene for a complete budget build in the second year. 
Designating the off years as years of minimal change, but allowing mechanisms for 
changes that do need to be made separately in program change proposals and budget 
change proposals also seems sensible and should cut down the turmoil involved in a 
complete POM-Budget rebuild each year. Therefore, we conclude that in this case, 
DOD change initiatives moved in the right direction without any supervision or 
oversight from Congress. In fact, if Congress had been involved one wonders whether 
any change would have taken place at all. Issues that seem non-partisan from the 
perspective of the Executive branch almost always become partisan when they reach the 
Hill.  
In summary, the sweeping grants of power proposed in the Defense Transformation 
Act provoked another round in a long running series of debates over delegation of 
congressional authority. Critics asked important questions including: Does a Secretary 
of Defense really need complete power over 700,000 civilians? Do all congressional 
reporting requirements need to be waived? Does DOD need a waiver of all 
environmental protection laws for training areas as was requested? The obvious danger 
for DOD in advancing comprehensive initiatives such as the DTA to Congress is that 
the collection of opponents will overwhelm the supporters. Thus, for example, 
opponents of the DTA in Congress found support from labor unions and civil service 
representatives, environmentalists, some senior uniformed military leaders (those not 
selected for promotion?), and virtually all parties lining up to oppose the reelection of 
George W. Bush in 2004. These and other groups banded together to delay reforms until 
the next administration arrived or a new the Secretary of Defense was appointed.  
History teaches us about management reform cycles. As explained later in this 
paper, just as the centralized management style of Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara (Thompson and Jones, 1994) was eventually followed by the decentralized 
style of Melvin Laird (Armed Forces Management. 1969; Laird, 2003), the centralized 
style of Donald Rumsfeld may be followed by a defense secretary with a different 
approach in the future. This fact provides a cautionary note about the future of defense 
transformation initiated under the Bush/Rumsfeld administration. From our view, the 
fact that Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz et. al. proposed comprehensive transformation of DOD 
was positive. Most changes proposed seem to be needed in my view. And the part of 
transformation related to PPBES was off to a reasonably good start by 2003, 
particularly those elements that could be executed within the jurisdiction of the 
Pentagon. As far as changes in defense budgeting and DOD oversight in Congress are 
concerned, less rather than more change may be expected. When the DOD budget is 
passed on to Congress in the President’s budget, it still will be considered and passed in 
annual appropriation bills. However, new approaches to DOD planning, programming 
and processes or a renewed emphasis on budget execution will proceed. 
Many other elements of the DTA that would appear to be absolutely necessary, e.g., 
speeding up the acquisition process and ensuring acquisition of products that equip 
forces to operate jointly, might move more quickly as incremental and internal DOD 
initiatives rather than as elements of comprehensive reform packages such as the DTA 
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that must be approved by an inevitably partisan and divided Congress reluctant to 
surrender additional decision authority to DOD.  
 
STATUS OF DOD BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION 
In assessing the accomplishments to date of DOD business transformation generally, 
and more specifically in the area of financial management, Lawrence J. Lanzillotta, then 
Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), made the following comments in his 
testimony to the House Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Government 
Efficiency and Financial Management, Subcommittee on National Security, and 
Subcommittee on Technology on July 7, 2004:  
Led by Secretary Rumsfeld, transforming DOD business management has been a top 
priority. The overarching aim has been achieving an integrated environment of DOD 
business processes -- supported by systems that efficiently deliver relevant decision-
making information to DOD leaders and fulfill all financial management requirements. 
The Department of Defense has undertaken an unprecedented, comprehensive, and 
visionary transformation to achieve this aim. We are making progress to correct 
weaknesses and control business system investments. Strong and consistent 
Congressional support of this transformation is vital to sustaining our progress 
(Lanzillotta, 2004).  
Lanzillotta outlined what he characterized as a "Three-Pillar Strategy" for 
transformation of DOD business management:  
 
1. Overhaul and integrate DOD business processes and systems through the 
Department’s Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP).  
 
2. Refine and advance the financial improvement plans of the military services 
and defense agencies to enable them to produce auditable financial statements 
resulting in clean (unqualified) audit opinions.  
 
3. Audit line items on financial statements as they become ready for such an audit.  
 
He noted that accomplishment of each of these goals was "essential" and that they 
needed to be "advanced simultaneously." Each must not be halted or delayed "without 
hurting the progress of the entire transformation." (Lanzillotta, 2004). Further, he 
explained that transformation would improve DOD business and financial management 
and enable DOD leaders to make resource decisions based on the best information and 
data obtainable. Further, these initiatives would enable DOD to comply with the 
requirements of the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act, including the production and 
issuance of "satisfactory financial statements." (Lanzillotta, 2004).   
In terms of specific accomplishments in transforming DOD Business Management 
over a three years period, Lanzillotta cited the following: 
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• Established a progressively more comprehensive inventory of all DOD business 
systems. (Total is currently over 4000 systems, and more systems are expected 
to be identified.)  
 
• Began to build a blueprint, or architecture, to guide the transformation from the 
current, stove-piped conglomeration of DOD business systems into an integrated 
environment of overhauled systems and processes. [The initial architecture has 
been developed for DOD by a consortium of contractors led by IBM] 
 
• Designed an incremental strategy to achieve our transformation goals and 
defined the focus for each increment.  
 
• Developed a governance process to provide strategic direction to oversee the 
transformation of business process and systems so they will transcend 
organizational boundaries and become integrated.  
 
• Organized all major DOD business activities into six areas or domains, and 
designated an Under Secretary of Defense (USD) as a Domain Owner to oversee 
each business area – for example, the USD for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics to oversee all logistics business activities.  
 
• Established a portfolio management process by which Domain Owners will 
oversee investments in information technology to ensure full integration of all 
DOD business processes and systems.  
 
• Established the DOD Audit Committee to provide a concerted senior leadership 
focus to produce auditable financial statements resulting in clean audit opinions.  
 
• Developed for individual reporting entities improvement plans that show 
planned improvements and milestones.  
 
• Implemented additional discipline in our quarterly reporting processes that have 
accelerated the preparation of financial reports and elevated our commitment to 
quality. (Lanzillotta, 2004). 
 
Lanzillotta also explained that "Domain Owners" have become responsible for 
overseeing the transformation of business activities managed by the Military Services 
and other DOD components. "This governance plan has already demonstrated that it can 
work, and we are continuing to strengthen and expand it. He noted that some observers 
do not believe that DOD was moving fast enough, but perhaps they did not appreciate 
that, "DOD is one of the world’s largest and most complex organizations, with a huge 
business transformation challenge. The Department of Defense is in business 
transformation for the long-term. It will take years to fix our systemic problems, which 
evolved over several decades." He also was careful to point out that DOD 
accomplishments have "significantly benefited from both Congressional and GAO 
support of our comprehensive transformation initiative. The Department of Defense is 
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in business transformation for the long-term. It will take years to fix our systemic 
problems... (Lanzillotta, 2004). 
In this regard he expressed concern over the "apparently contradictory direction" 
provided by Congress in the House and Senate FY 2005 defense authorization bills in 
that the legislation reduced funding, "essential to achieving the transformation" that was 
necessary and understood by all parties. He speculated the cuts were made based upon 
the perception that, "progress has been too slow, yet the funding cuts will make 
continued progress more difficult." (Lanzillotta, 2004).  In addition, the authorization 
bills propose radical changes in the roles of "Domain Owners" -- changing them from 
oversight of business systems to responsibility for "virtually all aspects of business 
systems." He explained that, "To date, the DOD approach has been to give Domain 
owners oversight responsibility using our prescribed architecture standards and business 
rules. This structure will enable Domain Owners to control business-related 
investments, ensure that standards are adhered to, and move DOD business systems and 
processes toward full integration. The complimentary nature of the domain process to 
traditional acquisition management enhances our ability to meet Service unique war 
fighting needs while implementing business standards across the Department... we 
should be careful about derailing this governance structure. It promises to overhaul and 
integrate DOD business activities – ultimately saving billions of dollars. Changing this 
governance structure could prevent us from eliminating stove-pipe systems or create 
new stove-pipe problems... we should resist centralizing all business system decisions 
and losing this expertise and perspective. " (Lanzillotta, 2004)    
In closing, he asked that Congress and DOD continue to cooperate in efforts to 
transform DOD business management, noting that, "Our business transformation 
progress is consistent with U.S. industry standards and it is all the more remarkable that 
our accomplishments have occurred while we fight the global war on terrorism and 
advancing bold initiatives to transform America’s military capabilities." (Lanzillotta, 
2004) 
The FY05 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) resulted in the following 
changes that will directly impact the goals and objectives cited above by Lanzillotta. 
Perhaps the biggest change was the direction to establish a Defense Business Systems 
Management Committee or DBSMC, to be chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
DEPSECDEF, now Gordon England. The DBSMC is the highest authority providing 
the top level, essential governance means to directly link improvements in business 
capability to warfighter needs and guide Defense business systems transformation. The 
FY05 NDAA established the DBSMC, with core responsibilities stated in the law. To 
implement the DBSMC, the Secretary of Defense approved a charter, which established 
the membership, roles and responsibilities of the DBSMC. (BMMP web site)  
 
As presented on the BMMP web site, the vision of the DBSMC is: 
 
To advance the development of world-class business operations in support of the 
Warfighter, the Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) is 
established. The DBSMC will recommend policies and procedures required to integrate 
DoD business systems transformation and to review and approve the defense business 
enterprise architecture and cross-Department, end-to-end interoperability of business 
systems and processes, as outlined in the attached charter. 
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Figure 1: BMMP Governance Structure 
Source: BMMP web site http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/bmmp/pages/governance.html 
 
As shown in figure 1 above, the DBSMC, Certification Authorities (CA) and 
associated Investment Review Boards (IRB) provide governance and oversight 
authority for the respective business areas. One should note that the responsibility for 
review, approval, and oversight of the planning, design, acquisition, deployment, 
operation, maintenance, and modernization of specific defense business systems is 
delegated to DOD Principle Staff Assistants (PSA) as Certification Authorities (CAs). 
Under NDAA, the following Certification Authorities have been designated: 
• The Under Secretary of Defense (USD) (AT&L) shall be responsible and 
accountable for any defense business system that supports acquisition activities, 
logistics activities, or installation and environment activities of the DoD.  
• The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)) shall be responsible 
and accountable for any defense business system that supports financial 
management activities or strategic planning and budgeting activities of the DoD.  
• The Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (USD (P&R)) shall 
be responsible and accountable for any defense business system that supports 
human resource management activities of the DoD.  
• The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) (NII) and the DoD CIO shall be 
responsible and accountable for any defense business system the primary 
purpose of which is to support information technology infrastructure or 
information assurance activities of the DoD.  
• The DepSecDef or an USD, as designated by the Secretary of Defense, shall be 
responsible for any defense business system that supports any activity of the 
DoD not covered by the established four CAs.  (BMMP, 
http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/bmmp/pages/govern_aas.html) 
 
Given the recent direction to restructure provided by law in the NDAA, we must 
wait to see how this new governance structure plays out in transforming defense 
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business systems. The GAO is certain to continue its vigilant watch dog role to ensure 
the DOD carefully manages the costs-to-benefit ratio of BMMP and other reform 
initiatives and programs. 
In related testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security on July 
8, 2004 the DOD Inspector General Joseph Schmitz made the following observations:   
 
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss...the status of progress in achieving an 
unqualified (clean) audit opinion for the Department of Defense and, second, other 
areas of financial management...The Department's financial statements are the most 
extensive, complex, and diverse financial statements in the Government. The 
Department faces financial management problems that are long-standing, pervasive, and 
deeply rooted in virtually all operations. These financial management problems have 
impeded the Department's ability to provide reliable, timely, and useful financial and 
managerial data to support operating, budgeting, and policy decisions. The problems 
have also prevented the Department from receiving an unqualified opinion on its 
financial statements. To address these issues, the Department has undertaken the 
ambitious task of overhauling its financial management systems and business processes. 
Although DOD has initiated a process to improve the reliability of its financial reporting 
and actions to correct previously reported weaknesses, most financial statements today 
remain unreliable and much work needs to be done. However, we are encouraged by the 
many current initiatives led by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer) and senior financial managers within the DOD 
Components to correct long-standing problems in order to achieve a favorable audit 
opinion by FY 2007. We believe there is a chance of reaching this goal; however, what 
is most encouraging is the effort being expended to correct the Department's 
problems...to adequately support the Department's goal of an unqualified audit opinion 
by FY 2007, we in the Office of the Inspector General put in place plans and actions to 
increase our financial auditing staff during the next three years. We also plan to issue 
several contracts with independent public accounting firms for financial and systems 
audit work as management asserts that their financial data is reliable and ready for audit. 
Over the next three years, the Department has reported that they could assert as being 
ready for audit over 100 lines, systems, or audit opinions. If the funding for our buildup 
and contracting efforts is delayed until the Department asserts that the entire financial 
statements are reliable and ready for audit, it will be impossible to complete necessary 
audit work in a timely manner--thus further delaying a favorable audit opinion on the 
U.S. Government Annual Financial Report (DODIG, 2004). 
 
It is clear that congressional views about the progress or lack thereof have been 
influenced by information provided to members and staff by the General Accounting 
Office (GAO), the audit arm of Congress. Commenting on the topic specifically, GAO 
representatives reported the following to Congress in early July 2004: 
 
DOD’s leadership remains committed to transforming the department’s business 
operations...DOD’s financial and business management weaknesses have resulted in 
billions of dollars in annual wasted resources in a time of increasing fiscal constraint. 
These weaknesses exist despite DOD requesting approximately $19 billion in fiscal year 
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2004 to operate, maintain, and modernize its reported 2,274 nonintegrated business 
systems. At a March 2004, hearing, DOD’s Comptroller stated that the actual number of 
systems could be twice the number reported...the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 
financial management and business related problems and key elements necessary for 
successful reform. Although the underlying conditions remain fundamentally 
unchanged, DOD continues to be confronted with pervasive problems related to its 
systems, processes (including internal controls), and people (human capital). (GAO, 
2004) 
 
The GAO report detailed background on DOD reform efforts in progress for 
Congress and GAO criticisms. GAO reiterated its position that the primary impediments 
to reform are absence of sustained Defense Department leadership and management 
accountability, deeply embedded cultural resistance to change, including military 
service parochialism and "stovepiped" operations, lack of results-oriented goals and 
performance measures and monitoring (an issue addressed later in this paper), and 
inadequate incentives and accountability mechanisms for business transformation. 
Additionally, GAO continues to recommend the establishment of the position of DOD 
Chief Management (or Operating) Officer (CMO). During a November, 2004 Senate 
Hearing on financial practices at the Defense Department, the Comptroller General of 
the United States, David M. Walker, strongly advocated for establishment of a CMO. 
He stated that the position should be encumbered by a level-two political appointee 
whose term should be a minimum of five years to ensure proper continuity. Walker 
further suggested that this person be someone dedicated to reform with a strong track 
record, perhaps from the private sector. He finished by saying that if the DOD fails to 
establish this position transformation of their financial systems is bound for failure in 
his opinion. While GAO clearly wants DOD business transformation to succeed, its 
advice to Congress may be viewed by some as inhibiting the achievement of this goal, 
as suggested by the DOD Comptroller in his testimony to Congress. 
At a recent conference titled: Defense Finance 2005, Dr. Dov Zakheim, the former 
DOD Comptroller, offered support for Walker’s position by saying that “a CMO is 
critical…(and) the only way to ensure momentum.” Zakheim went on to say; “if (the 
CMO) term is four years or less, it’s a waste of time.”  Finally, in his presentation, he 
suggested that he sees the GAO as “a co-conspirator of the comptroller in FM (financial 
management).” It is worth noting that Zakheim was relentless in his efforts to lead the 
transformation of business systems in the Department of Defense during his tenure and, 
as a Vice President for a prominent consulting firm, he remains an important and 
influential voice for reform (Zakheim 2005). 
One point that is noteworthy in comparing the DOD Comptroller's statement, the 
testimony from GAO, and action by Congress in Fiscal Year 2005 Defense 
Authorization legislation is the issue of stove-piped or disconnected military department 
and service organizations and business improvement initiatives. Both DOD and GAO 
identify this as a problem yet Congress appears willing to delegate more authority to 
these semi-autonomous organizations within DOD (what Office of the Secretary of 
Defense staff refers to as "DOD Components") in implementation of business 
management transformation. One wonders how much that lobbying by the military 
departments and services might have influenced congressional action that the DOD 
Comptroller found objectionable.  
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As understood by most insiders, external observers and some members of Congress, 
successful transformation of DOD business practices and systems will take much time 
and money (Jonas, 2002; Lanzillotta, 2002, 2004). However, a significant amount of 
transformation has taken place in DOD that neither the DOD Comptroller nor GAO 
identified. In this light we now turn to evaluation of recent transformation of the major 
resource planning and decision systems used by DOD.  
 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM 
Exploring briefly DOD human resource transformation, the DOD Civilian Human 
Resources Strategic Plan begins, “There is a civilian human resources dilemma in the 
Department of Defense." (DOD, 2004a) This dilemma results from the confluence of 
several factors: the transformation of the operational side of the department, the 
downsizing of the department since the end of the Cold War, outmoded civil service 
laws and regulations, and changes in public management principles.  The size of the 
DOD civilian workforce evolved in an under-managed fashion in the past 15 years. The 
post-Cold War “peace dividend” resulted in a 36% decrease in the size of the civilian 
workforce of from 1989-2001 - over 375,000 employees.  Because of civil service rules 
that favor seniority over performance, the majority of those retained were older and 
more senior employees.  In 1989, 46% of DOD employees had less than 10 years 
service, by 2001 that figure fell to 23%. Concurrently, the proliferation of desktop 
computing and the adoption of public management reform principles (especially 
outsourcing) resulted in a shift away from blue collar and clerical work (51% of the 
workforce in 1989) towards white collar and professional work (65% of the workforce 
in 2001).  The average pay grade of a DOD civilian rose as did their education level.  
These changes were not all intentional.  
The dilemma is that the civil service rules that resulted in the current status are 
inadequate to adapt the workforce to meet the challenges posed by operational 
transformation. Civil Service reform in the United States has been episodic and in 2004, 
the Department is in the midst of shaping the next episode (OPM, 2004). It is important 
that the design of new human resource management systems is well designed to provide 
flexibility and control for the future. As David Walker, Comptroller General of the 
United States recently testified, “...strategic human capital management must be the 
centerpiece of any serious government transformation effort. The federal personnel 
system is clearly broken in critical respects – designed for a time and workforce of an 
earlier era and not able to meet the needs and challenges of our current rapidly changing 
and knowledge-based environment.” (Walker, 2003) 
This current opportunity for HR transformation is embodied in the emerging design 
and implementation of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS). NSPS is the 
legislated result of the Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act legislative 
proposal offered by the Department of Defense in April 2003. The proposal is based 
largely on the results of the Best Practices Initiative that studied the Demonstration 
Projects at various DOD laboratories. The Demonstration Projects began in 1980 at the 
Naval Weapons Center in China Lake, California under the authority of the Civil 
Service Reform Act of 1978. The project used pay-banding and performance measures 
as alternative management tools over those available under Title V of the U.S. Code. 
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Over the years, legislative authority has spread the use of these demonstration projects 
to several other DOD activities.   
When Congress authorized NSPS, it did not legislate a new personnel system (U.S. 
Congress, 2003). Rather, Congress delegated the authority to DOD to design a new 
system. The department planned to implement a new system within months of approval, 
but critical stakeholders (primarily labor unions, but also other government agencies1) 
slowed progress and the implementation timeline now extends to 2009 (DOD, 2004b).  
This delay provides an opportunity for greater study and more deliberate design 
grounded in the operational transformation of the department. 
NSPS includes the authority to change staffing practices: hiring, assignment, 
advancement, and removal. It includes the authority to change job classifications, pay, 
and performance management. It includes changes to labor relations and the processes 
for discipline, adverse actions and appeals. New authorities include permanent direct 
hire ability for people with special skills. These authorities are broad and can have a 
significant and lasting impact on the department. Their design must consider that which 
is required to develop a workforce with the knowledge, skills and capabilities that 
operational transformation demands.    
On the other hand, law outside of Title V (USC) remained largely unchanged. Merit 
system principles (such as veterans’ preference provisions) remain intact. Rules against 
unlawful personnel practices (e.g., nepotism) and unlawful discrimination remain. 
These provisions should not detract from the design and implementation of a robust 
system. Leave, travel, health benefits and safety programs remain to be transformed.  
Walker (2003) has recommended an institutional infrastructure with the following 
elements: (a) a human capital planning process which integrates policies and strategies 
with programs and desired outcomes, (b) capabilities to develop and implement a new 
human capital system, and (c) a modern, effective performance measurement system 
with reasonable transparency and accountability.   
At this point the development of the NSPS is underway and it is too soon to evaluate 
changes that are proposed but not yet implemented. One evident question beyond the 
NSPS is whether Congress would be willing to delegate similar authority to DOD to 
transform its military personnel systems, given that DOD proposed to take on this 
formidable task. 
Finally, to add to what is noted elsewhere in this paper, it is crucial for DOD to 
increase emphasis on education and training of its civilian and military workforce to 
keep pace with the technological transformation of the Information Age and to 
understand and apply smart practice business management methods in defense 
organizations. It is also imperative for DOD to reconsider how it educates its workforce 
in the management of change in complex organizations and act proactively to redress 
shortcomings in knowledge, skills and abilities. 
 
ACQUISITION CHANGE IN THE PAST DECADE AND CURRENT 
TRANSFORMATION  
Considering the difficulty of providing technologically advanced systems in a cost-
effective manner in a highly political environment, one might expect that our 
acquisition system would be an easy target for criticism and reform. Indeed, calls for 
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acquisition reform characterize the history of DOD management reform in the entire 
post-WW II period. The pattern of evolutionary change during the past decade has been 
continuous as fiscal pressures, downsizing trends, technological advances, and emergent 
and diverse threats have led policy makers to promote a number of major initiatives. 
Some of these reforms, embodied in legislation, in regulation, and in DOD policy 
statements, reflect a preference for commercial products and processes as means for 
controlling costs and incorporating new technology, as well a move toward more 
flexible and adaptive acquisition management procedures.   
Significant acquisition reform legislation from Congress has included the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994. FASA stimulated the procurement of 
commercial items rather than government sponsorship of production, authorized 
simplified purchases of less than $2,500 through purchase cards, streamlined purchases 
between $2,500 but not exceeding $100,000, reserving these for small businesses, made 
electronic commerce the desired method of procurement, and promoted use of multiple 
awards of task and delivery order contracts. Additionally, Section 845 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 1994 provided for the use of what are termed “other 
transactions” (OTs) for contracting actions authorized outside the normal specified 
authority of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), e.g., for development of 
prototype equipment suitable for joint military and commercial use.  
Two years later, the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) gave contracting 
officials increased discretion in competition decisions and simplified acquisition 
procedures for commercial items up to $5 million. The Information Technology 
Management Reform Act (ITMRA), which together with FARA became known as the 
Clinger-Cohen Act, focused on efficient management of government information 
technology (IT). It repealed the Brooks Act, thereby removing from the General 
Services Administration the exclusive authority for procurement of IT and vested that 
authority in agencies. It also led to creation of agency Chief Information Officer 
positions and, in DOD, the combining of acquisition management policies and 
procedures for both weapon systems and IT systems. 
With respect to Federal Acquisition Regulation changes, major reforms were 
embodied in the 1997 re-write of Part 15 that governs the conduct of competitive 
negotiations. The purpose of this initiative was to reengineer the processes used to 
contract by negotiation, with the intent of reducing the resources necessary for source 
selection and reducing time to contract award. The rewrite formalized the “best value” 
goal in acquisition, and promoted more open exchanges between the negotiating parties, 
allowing industry to better understand government requirements and the government to 
better understand industry proposals. (Federal Register, 1997) 
A flurry of far-reaching reform-oriented DOD acquisition management policies 
emerged during the mid-1990s stimulated by Vice President Al Gore’s National 
Performance Review. In 1994 Secretary of Defense William Perry directed DOD to 
decrease reliance on military-unique specifications and standards and instead to 
promote use of performance and commercial specifications and standards. The reform 
largely freed contractors from complying with often outdated military specifications and 
standards, thereby decreasing costs and improving access to state-of-the-art technology. 
Perry followed this directive with another only a few months later in 1995 when he 
ordered, “a fundamental change in the way the Department acquires goods and 
services” in a move to Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) in 
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acquisition.  This management technique, used successfully by many private sector 
firms, simultaneously integrates all essential acquisition activities through the use of 
multidisciplinary teams (so-called Integrated Product Teams, or IPTs) to optimize 
design, testing, production, and logistics processes. Interestingly, Perry’s directive 
called for the use of IPPD not only in weapon system design and production, but also in 
Pentagon review and oversight of acquisition programs. 
Later in 1995, Paul Kaminsky, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology, introduced the concept of “cost as an independent variable” (CAIV) in 
response to the constrained fiscal environment for national defense see more below). 
CAIV entails performing cost-performance trades early in acquisition programs to set 
cost objectives at affordable and efficient levels, and then aggressively managing 
programs to meet those objectives.  Cost thus becomes a major driver in a program, 
even to the extent that weapon system performance improvements may be traded off to 
meet cost targets. Kaminsky termed CAIV “DOD’s equivalent of best commercial 
business practices” viewing it as consistent with commercial practices in new system 
development where market forces would drive the price of new systems. Following this 
change Kaminsky established the Single Process Initiative (SPI) to give defense firms 
opportunities to implement single manufacturing or management processes at their 
facilities to replace the multiple processes often required by existing contracts (see also 
below). This provided firms the flexibility to use the most efficient business and 
manufacturing processes in their facilities and products. SPI was intended to reduce 
costs associated with doing business with the government by eliminating the need for 
firms to maintain different manufacturing and management processes to comply with 
contractual requirements.  
DOD Directive 5000.1 initiated cost as an independent variable (CAIV) as an 
improvement in development and performance of acquisition program cost analysis. 
System performance and target costs are to be analyzed on a cost-performance tradeoff 
basis. The CAIV process is intended to make cost a more significant constraint as a 
variable in analysis of effectiveness and suitability of systems. CAIV is intended to 
reduce acquisition costs. CAIV also is intended to make cost a stronger driver in system 
design in response to restricted budgets. Such an approach also was consistent with 
commercial practices in new system developments, where market forces drive the price 
of new systems. 
CAIV has been intended to help program managers recognize that the majority of 
costs are determined early in a program life cycle. Consequently, the best time to reduce 
life-cycle costs is early in the acquisition process. Cost reductions are accomplished 
through cost and performance tradeoff analysis, to be conducted before a specific 
acquisition approach is selected. Incentives are applied to both government and industry 
to achieve the objectives of CAIV. Awards programs and “shared savings” programs 
have been used creatively to encourage generation of cost-saving ideas for all phases of 
life-cycle costs. Incentive programs have targeted individuals and government and 
industry teams. The program manager (PM) works closely with the user to achieve 
proper balance among cost, schedule, and performance while ensuring that systems are 
both affordable and cost-effective. The PM, together with the user, propose cost 
objectives and thresholds for Milestone Decision Authority approval, which will then be 
controlled through the acquisition project baseline process (Lifecycle Costs). The PM 
searches continually for innovative practices to reduce life-cycle costs and liabilities.  
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However, because of problems related to DOD surrendering responsibility for 
original design to private sector contractors, where problems are designed into programs 
in the beginning and are not caught, costs become more difficult to control. This has led 
some observers complaining that specification of program requirements has been 
outsourced and is beyond the control of DOD. And this is in spite of the comment 
allegedly made by Secretary Rumsfeld that, "It isn't a requirement until I say it is a 
requirement." 
The Single Process Initiative (SPI) was given added impetus in 2002 when 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld directed DOD to change the management and 
manufacturing requirements of existing contracts to unify them within one facility, 
where appropriate (Rumsfeld, 2002). This initiative also is referred to as the block 
change program. Program managers are tasked to ensure that SPI reduces weapon 
acquisition costs. Allowing defense contractors to use a single process in their facilities 
is a natural progression from the contract-by-contract process of removing military-
unique specifications and standards initiated by DOD in response to the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. Under SPI contractors are supposed to incur 
additional transition costs equal to or exceeding savings in the near term. Moving to 
common, facility-wide requirements is intended to reduce government and contractor 
costs in the long term. 
Acquisition reform has also extended to the way in which war fighting needs and 
requirements are developed to justify new acquisition programs. The new Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is intended to move this 
process away from a threat-based, service-centric approach and more toward one that 
evaluates existing and proposed capabilities in light of their contribution to future joint 
concepts. 
 The overall trend of resource constraints in the acquisition arena in the past decade, 
combined with threat driven changes and new technologies have increased acquisition 
costs and have increased pressures for greater reliance on private sector products and 
processes to improve performance. As noted in the above, the movement to adopt better 
acquisition management practices is part of a trend of Defense Department initiatives 
instituted under the administrations of George H. W. Bush and continued under the 
administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. The Transformation in Business 
Affairs of the current administration has four primary goals in the area of acquisition 
according to DOD. First, it intends to stimulate the production of high quality defense 
products. Second, it is supposed to reduce average acquisition systems cycle time for all 
major acquisition programs by 25 percent (from 132 months to 99 months). Third, DOD 
wants to lower total ownership costs (TOC) of defense products, with the goal of 
minimizing cost growth in major acquisition programs to no more than 1 percent 
annually. The fourth goal is to reduce overhead costs to provide less expensive weapons 
platforms. In some cases, these goals may be achieved by purchasing assets (typically 
components of, or support items for, weapons and systems) manufactured by the private 
sector for general (non-defense specific) markets. Given the size of the annual federal 
budget deficit for 2003 and beyond, constrained budgets for defense may be anticipated. 
However, the mission of DOD continues to expand as the U.S. faces new, more diverse, 
terrorist threats. Consequently, acquisition, procurement and contracting processes must 
become more efficient and focus on cost control. 
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Other acquisition transformation initiatives emphasizing continuous reform include 
revision of the DOD 5000-series of acquisition rules and guidelines, spiral acquisition 
(continuous and simultaneous program and project research, development, test, 
evaluation and procurement rather than serial/sequential processes), commercial off the 
shelf procurement (COTS), and the Director of Acquisition program initiative and 
(McCaffery and Jones, 2004).  
During the past decade the DOD 5000-series has been continuously revised as 
Presidential administrations changed and in response to the reforms described above. In 
2002 Secretary Rumsfeld directed that DOD 5000.2R would be converted from a 
regulatory tool to a more functional and flexible policy guidance document. The 5000-
series had in the past been regarded as administrative law. It demanded user 
requirements including the preparation operational requirements documents (ORD) and 
estimation of initial operational capability. The 5000.2R acquisition requirements had 
been firm and not subject to modification without specific waivers. However, Rumsfeld 
and staff, the services, and program managers recognized the need for greater flexibility 
to manage acquisition. The new DOD 5000.2-R document promises to piggy-back on 
other recent acquisition reforms, allowing greater flexibility and control for acquisition 
leadership. DOD 5000.2-R was revised to recommend that integrated process teams 
(IPT) be used during program definition to improve the specification of requirements 
and system supportability. In addition, program structure changes are directed to include 
an acquisition strategy of open systems. To maximize program effectiveness, the 
program manager is directed to use commercial sources, risk management, and CAIV. 
Reforms direct Program Managers to use program designs incorporating integrated 
product and process development (IPPD) and place system engineering emphasis on 
production capability, quality, acquisition logistics, and open system design. 
Although previous versions of the 5000-series documents have always 
acknowledged the desirability and need for flexible management approaches, 
administrative discretion, and sound business judgments in acquisition, many in DOD 
have tended to a more bureaucratic mindset of strict adherence to these documents, 
thereby providing them the virtual status of administrative law. The revision of May 12, 
2003, approved by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, continued to attack 
this mindset by promoting flexibility, responsiveness, innovation, and streamlined 
decentralized management as governing acquisition policies. Further, the framework for 
managing acquisition programs under the current 5000-series emphasizes evolutionary 
and incremental strategies rather than “grand strategies” that may tend to limit 
flexibility, change, and innovation. 
The Director of Acquisition Program Initiative is another element of acquisition 
reform. Annually, the Director of Acquisition Program Integration determines if each 
Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) has reached 90 percent or more of cost, 
schedule, and performance parameters when compared to acquisition program baseline 
thresholds. The appropriate decision authority must make a similar determination for 
non-major acquisition programs. If ten percent or more of program parameters are 
missed, a timely review is required. The review addresses any breaches in cost, 
schedule, and performance and recommends suitable action, including program 
termination.  
Major acquisition defense program baselines must be coordinated with the DOD 
Comptroller before approval. Cost parameters are limited to RDT&E, acquisition, the 
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costs of acquisition of items procured with operations and maintenance funds, total 
quantity, and average unit acquisition cost. As a program progresses through later 
acquisition phases, acquisition costs are refined based on contractor actual costs from 
Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR), engineering, manufacturing and 
development, or from initial production lots. Cost, schedule, and performance 
objectives are used in application of the Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) 
process to set the Acquisition Program Baselines. Cost, schedule, and performance may 
be traded-off by the PM, within the range between the objective and the threshold 
without obtaining Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) approval. This initiative is 
intended to improve executive level oversight and program management reporting. In 
addition, it may enhance executive and PM flexibility in the best use of available 
funding. 
The reforms noted above have open a wide range of new possibilities for acquisition 
which DOD is only now beginning to explore. Stimulated under the leadership of 
former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Jacques Gansler in the 1990s and 
continued under the Bush administration, these new approaches are pursued reflecting 
fundamentally different configurations of government-contractor relationships in 
acquisition. The initiatives increased outsourcing, competitive sourcing, privatization 
initiatives, public-private partnerships, and franchising. The outcomes of such programs 
remain to be assessed, but they indicate the environment of tremendous potential (and 
uncertainty) that now exists for acquisition policy-makers and managers.  
In mid-2004 Deputy Under Secretary for Defense (Acquisition, Transportation and 
Logistics) John Young requested that service acquisition system commands reorganize 
themselves to create and clarify ownership and accountability for weapons platform and 
systems development and execution to eliminate poor management practices and 
overlapping, unclear lines of authority and responsibility characteristic of many of these 
commands. While this is an enormous undertaking, the commands have complied with 
significant redesigns of their structures and staffs. While the proof of this latest 
transformation effort in the acquisition commands is still in progress, many observers 
note that this type of change to clarify managerial and control responsibility and 
accountability is a long-needed improvement. However, whether the redesigned 
organizations will accomplish the desired objective remains to be evaluated. 
 To move focus briefly to the related area of contracting reform (much change has 
occurred in the contracting arena that is beyond the scope of this paper), recent trends 
reflect a significant increase in DOD contracting for services, as in the rest of the 
federal government. Many functions that had been viewed in previous years as properly 
provided by government are now provided by private sources. While holding promise 
for increased efficiency and lower costs in service delivery, this trend raises numerous 
questions, e.g., how to best determine the proper definition and extent of “core” 
government competencies, how to design appropriate contracting mechanisms, and how 
to provide adequate oversight and contract management. Significant reform in education 
and training has been implemented in the past decade to upgrade the management 
capability of the DOD workforce, but large challenges remain and new problems have 
emerged as contractor replace military and DOD employees in commands at home and 
abroad in the war fighting environment.    
In some cases, the appropriateness and wisdom of the roles of contractors working 
in military operations has provided high visibility material for the media. Some number 
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of highly trained special forces and other military personnel have left the services to 
become much more highly paid contractors, as the scope of their duties also has been 
the subject of scrutiny from Congress. Further, the deaths of forty-two Halliburton/KBR 
employees (as of July 2, 2004) in support of the war in Iraq raise numerous contracting 
and logistics issues too complex to be explored here. It may be expected, however, that 
these issues will remain to be resolved as U.S. forces continue to employ contractors in 
trouble spots around the world to perform, via the private sector, what are quasi-military 
functions and duties. Some critics ask whether this is the front-end phase of the 
privatization of the U.S. military to cope with high deployment and operating tempo 
requirements. 
 In summary, many of the issues and initiatives identified above have much to do 
with the evolution of public-private relationships and partnerships that is a world-wide 
trend. New institutional arrangements have emerged in virtually every area of provision 
of services to the public at all levels of government. The basic challenges in weapon 
system development and procurement remain, as evidenced in results, e.g., continuing 
management and technical problems in major acquisition programs including the F-22 
Raptor and V-22 Osprey. Further, the effects of defense industry consolidation on 
weapons development and production remain unclear. The overall challenge to DOD is 
how to re-capitalize an aging force structure where costs are high and RDT&E and 
procurement budgets do not match projected requirements and military service re-
capitalization plans and schedules. Changes in the defense industry in many cases 
confound the problem of attempting to use the market to achieve greater efficiency in 
theory supposed to result from competition. Both the theory and the arguably partisan 
rhetoric about the advantages of market pressures are fine, but where there is no market 
and, therefore, no competition, few if any advantages may be found. 
The initiatives explicated here are but a few of the many acquisition changes 
currently under implementation as under the defense business transformation flag. 
Issues that have been raised about the wave of continuous reform include whether there 
is too much change taking place at once to be fully assimilated by a defense acquisition 
workforce that has been reduced in size and has lost some critical expertise due to 
budget and staff reductions -- and whether new processes have resulted in excessive 
centralization of authority in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the expense of 
efficiency, effective communication and program management and, in some cases, 
common sense (Dillard, 2003). 
 
EVOLUTION OF THE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING,  
BUDGETING, EXECUTION SYSTEM 
Since the 1960s the Department of Defense has prepared its plan and budget using the 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting System, or PPBS, which was renamed PPBES in 
2003 with the added E for execution. This section of the paper reviews and evaluates 
the evolution of this system over that past fifty years. Description and analysis of the 
transformation to PPBES then follows. 
While PPBS was discontinued for the federal government as a whole 35 years ago, 
it has continued to be employed by the DOD because it meets the policy development 
and participatory demands of multi-service budget advocacy while also providing a 
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long-term perspective on programs and spending. While DOD manages its internal 
resource management systems, this is done under the watchful eyes of Congress. 
Consequently, in resource planning and in budget preparation and execution, DOD 
continually searches for a greater delegation of authority from Congress to permit the 
exercise of greater managerial discretion to improve efficiency and respond to 
contingencies. Recent reforms in through the Defense Transformation Act to increase 
such delegation were requested by DOD in 2003 before Congress. 
A number of issues related to planning and budgeting for national defense confound 
DOD and congressional decision makers annually. Among these are how to perform 
effective and competent threat assessment and the consequences of doing this job well 
or poorly. Another issue is how much to spend on national defense. This is determined 
in large part by the perceived threat. The perception of threat also must be interpreted in 
the dynamics of the politics of budgeting for defense. Numerous variables affect public 
opinion about threat and spending. Debate and consensus building for national defense 
budgets is part of our democratic political tradition. Budgeting for national defense is 
always complicated by conflicting political opinion and information, and also the need 
for selective degrees of secrecy with respect to identifying and evaluating the threat and 
budgetary responses to it. These conditions make marketing the need for national 
defense spending an inevitable task and part of the obligation of defense advocates 
working in an open political system.  
Because so much of the policy framework and budget of the Department of Defense 
is determined by Congress, which under the U.S. Constitution has sole power to tax and 
spend, analysis of resource allocation for defense cannot ignore the political context 
within which decisions are made and executed. Policy development and resource 
planning for defense is inextricably linked to constituent politics in defense budgeting. 
National security policy choice and implementation is made more difficult by the highly 
pluralistic nature of the resource allocation decision environment (Wildavsky 1988: 
191-193; Adelman and Augustine, 1990). Still, disagreements over policy and resource 
allocation should be anticipated and, indeed, welcomed in a democracy. 
Policy development, planning, and resource-allocation decision making for the U.S. 
Department of Defense is a task of enormous complexity due to the nature and size of 
the Defense Department and the highly differentiated nature of its mission and 
activities. The Department of Defense plans, prepares, negotiates, and makes decisions 
on policy, programs, and resource allocation using the Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System. 
PPBS was implemented in DOD originally by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara 
and by Charles Hitch, Robert Anthony, and others during the administrations of 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in the 1960s (Thompson and Jones, 1994). Prior to 
1962, the DOD did not have a top-down coordinated approach for planning and 
budgeting (Puritano, 1981; Korb, 1977; Korb, 1979; Joint DOD/GAO Working Group 
on PPBS, 1983). Until this time, the Secretary of Defense had played a limited role in 
budget review as each military service developed and defended its own budget. 
McNamara had used PPBS when he was the President of the Ford Motors Corporation 
and he and Hitch, his Comptroller, had confidence that the system would be valuable 
for long-range resource planning and allocation in DOD. McNamara wanted PPBS to 
become the primary resource decision and allocation mechanism used by the DOD. 
McNamara implemented the system after President John F. Kennedy tasked him to 
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establish tighter control by the Secretary of Defense, a civilian, over the military 
departments and services. As a former member of Congress, Kennedy was highly 
distrustful of the military service planning and budgeting. He ordered McNamara to 
take control of DOD planning and budgeting away from the military and put it in the 
hands of civilian leadership. Consequently, the initial motivation for establishing PPBS 
had as much to do with control and politics as it did with rational resource planning and 
budgeting. By June 30, 1964, PPB was operational within the Department of Defense 
(Thompson and Jones, 1994; Feltes, 1976; Korb, 1977; Korb, 1979). 
Hitch implemented PPBS and systems analysis throughout DOD, but most of the 
program analysis was done by his “whiz kids” in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) under the Comptroller and the office of Program Analysis and Evaluation. The 
military departments were not anxious to implement PPBS, but had to do so eventually 
to play in the new planning and budgeting game run and orchestrated by Hitch and his 
staff. After a few years, the military departments were fully engaged in learning how to 
compete in the new PPBS process. However, as noted, PPBS was not just budget reform 
– it was a new approach to analysis and competition between alternative programs, 
weapons systems and, ultimately, multi-year programmatic objectives. Additional 
reforms beyond PPBS were to be proposed by DOD under the Johnson administration. 
Charles Hitch was followed as DOD Comptroller by Robert N. Anthony, a professor 
of management control on loan from Harvard University’s School of Business, who 
proposed an ambitious set of changes to DOD budgeting and accounting in 1966 in 
what was termed Project Prime. Among other things, Project Prime would have divided 
all parts of DOD into mission, revenue, expense and service centers, consistent with 
management control theory according to Anthony, and required accrual accounting with 
reimbursable fee-for-service internal transactional payments (using negotiated or 
shadow prices) throughout DOD (Thompson and Jones, 1994: 66-68). What Anthony 
envisioned was a reimbursable accounting process similar to what was implemented in 
much of DOD by Comptroller Sean O’Keefe and Deputy Comptroller Donald Shycoff 
as part of the Defense Management Report initiatives of 1989-1992 under the Bush 
administration and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney (Jones and Bixler, 1992). Project 
Prime also included accrual accounting and budgeting for DOD. Accrual accounting is 
required now under the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, which DOD has been 
unable to implement successfully. Clearly, Anthony was ahead of his time in his vision 
of how DOD accounting and budgeting should be organized (Thompson and Jones, 
1994: 67-68).  
Congress did not support Anthony’s proposed changes. Key members of the 
appropriations committees refused to allow the change to accrual accounting and 
rejected Project Prime, probably because they thought it would reduce their leverage to 
micromanage DOD through the budget. Opposition was so strong that it was suggested 
Anthony should be asked to resign. Anthony was not asked to do so, but chose to return 
to Harvard and the experiment was ended (Jones, 2001b). Not until 2003 did DOD 
return to Congress with such a sweeping reform proposal – the Defense Transformation 
Act.  
The post-WWII sequence of budget reforms that led to PPBS in the 1960s started 
with performance budgeting in the 1950s. In essence, performance budgeting 
(Burkhead, 1959: chapters 6-7, and 133-181) attempts to connect inputs to outputs. As 
implemented by the President’s Bureau of the Budget (BOB) under the Eisenhower 
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administration, performance budgeting (PB) in the 1950s was characterized by 
indicators of cost per unit of work accomplished, focusing on workload measures rather 
than outputs or outcomes. The history of performance budgeting includes the Taft 
Commission of 1912 which recommended it be implemented and its implementation in 
the Department of Agriculture in 1934 and the Tennessee Valley Authority in the later 
1930s, as well as having been strongly recommended by the Hoover Commission in 
1949 (McCaffery and Jones, 2001: 69).  
In 1949, Congress required that the budget estimates of the Department of Defense be 
presented in performance categories. Performance budgeting was an executive branch 
managerial budget tool. During the 1950s under the leadership of Bureau of the Budget 
Director Maurice Stans and others, executive budgeting was transformed somewhat 
radically through the institution of performance measures into budgets. Many of the 
measures had already been in use for decades as proxies that facilitated and simplified 
negotiations between the Executive and Congress. However, in this first wave of 
performance budgeting (the second wave would hit in the 1990s) great effort was exerted 
to develop measures of performance and relate these to appropriations and spending. In 
fact, many of the measures developed in this era did not measure performance. Instead, 
because it was easier (and perhaps the only approach possible), workload and input cost 
data were used in place of real measures of performance. Still, budgeting in this era moved 
far from the simple line-item formats of the past. Formulae and ratios between proposed 
spending and actions were integrated into the Executive budget along with explanations of 
what the measures demonstrated and how they related to justifications for additional 
resources. (McCaffery and Jones, 2001: 69) 
The emphasis of budget reform shifted in the early 1960s to what was termed 
“program budgeting.” Program budgeting (Mosher, 1954; Novick, 1969) was and is a 
variation of or evolution from performance budgeting in which information is collected 
by program categories, without much of the detail of the performance-budget 
construction. These categories of spending are tied to specific objectives to be achieved. 
Activities are grouped by department, agency, and then by mission objective and 
sometimes by function and projected for a five-year period. Program budgeting was 
experimented with in the Department of Agriculture in the early 1960s as reported by 
Wildavsky and Hammond (Wildavsky and Hammond, 1962) and later adopted 
throughout the entire federal government through Executive Order by President Lyndon 
Johnson in 1966.  
The Programming, Planning, Budgeting System (Lee and Johnson, 1983; Hinricks 
and Taylor, 1969; Merewitz and Sosnick, 1972; Schick, 1966; Schick, 1973; McCaffery 
and Jones, 2001: 70) was intended to be a thorough analysis and planning system that 
incorporated multiple sets of plans and programs. Under Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara and DOD Comptroller Charles Hitch, PPBS drew upon methods from 
various disciplines, including economics, systems analysis, strategic planning, 
cybernetics, and public administration to array and analyze alternative means and goals 
by program and then derive benefit/cost ratios intended to indicate which means and 
ends to choose. Budgeting under this system was to become a simple matter of costing 
out the goal chosen.  
In theory, the program budgets that resulted from PPBS were supposed to provide 
the Executive and Congress information on what the federal government was spending 
for particular categories, e.g., health, education, public safety, etc. across all 
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departments and agencies. Program budgets may best be understood as matrices with 
program categories on one axis and departments on the other. Thus, in the fully 
articulated program budget Congress could determine how much was spent on health or 
education in total in all departments and agencies and this would promote deliberation 
over whether this was enough, too much or too little.  
President Lyndon Johnson thought that PPBS was so successful in DOD that in 
1966 he issued an executive order to have it implemented throughout the federal 
government. Regrettably, although Executive branch departments prepared their 
program budgets and related spending to objectives, Congress largely ignored what it 
was presented, preferring to stick with the traditional appropriations framework for 
analysis and enactment of the budget. (Schick, 1973) Why was this the case? Perhaps 
program budgets presented too much information to be used and understood by 
Congress. Alternatively, and as likely, perhaps Congress perceived that program 
budgeting would reduce the power of members of appropriations committees because 
the budget in this format would be determined too much by formula, thus decreasing the 
political spending discretion of Congress (Jones and Bixler, 1992). Although the 
government-wide experiment with PPBS was suspended by President Richard Nixon in 
1969, this was done more for political than efficiency reasons. However, PPBS was 
perceived in much of the Executive branch and Congress as paper-heavy and 
consuming too much staff time for preparation and analysis (Schick, 1973). Still, the 
system continued to be used in the Department of Defense, in part because DOD 
purchases substantial long-lived capital assets and since PPB requires long-range 
planning as its first component, it suited the needs of the Defense Department.  
Thus, despite criticism that PPBS was a failure in the federal government, the process 
remained in use by the DOD and has been modified incrementally so as to operate 
effectively despite some evident flaws (Wildavsky 1988: 186-202; Puritano, 1981, 
McCaffery and Jones, 2001). While the manner in which PPBS operates has varied under 
different Presidents and Secretaries of Defense, the basic characteristics of the system have 
remained in place for more than 40 years. During this period, three significant reform 
initiatives have influenced the PPB system: the Laird reforms, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 
and the Rumsfeld transformation in 2001-2003. 
 
Laird Reforms 
In 1969, Melvin Laird was appointed Secretary of Defense by President-elect Richard 
Nixon to succeed McNamara. Laird brought a different management orientation to the 
Defense Department, one more in keeping with its historical predilections, emphasizing 
decentralization and military service primacy. If McNamara increased scientific decision 
making in the Pentagon, he also installed a centralized management approach. Systems 
analysis, top-down planning, and benefit/cost analysis supported this centralized focus. 
One of the key bureaucratic players was the Office of Policy Analysis, which made use of 
the tools cited above to help McNamara centralize decisions in the Office of Secretary of 
Defense (Thompson and Jones, 1994: 68-73). Laird’s methods ran counter to this 
approach, emphasizing participatory management and decentralization of power. 
Beginning in 1969, Laird shifted decision making power away from the DOD staff 
agencies to the Military Department Secretaries, because there were, “…many decisions 
that should be made by the Services Secretaries and they should have the responsibility for 
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running their own programs. I have no business being involved in how many 20mm guns 
should go on a destroyer. That is the Secretary of the Navy's business. I must let the 
Services take a greater role.” (Feltes, 1976) Laird also pursued a process of participatory 
management, in which he hoped to gain the cooperation of the military leadership in 
reducing the defense budget and the size of the forces.  
During Laird’s four-year tenure, U.S. troop strength in Vietnam fell from 549,500 
persons in 1969 to 69,000 in May of 1972. (Laird, 2003). Laird was preoccupied with 
disengaging from Vietnam, but not to the exclusion of other issues, such as burden-sharing 
costs with other nations, maintaining technological superiority (e.g., B-1 bomber, Trident 
submarine), improved procurement, enhanced operational readiness, and strategic 
sufficiency and limitations on the nuclear build-up (Feltes, 1976; Armed Forces 
Management, 1969). He ended the selective service draft in January of 1973 and was 
persistent in his efforts to secure the release of American POWs.  
Laird spent a lot of time preparing for and testifying in Congress and improved DOD 
relations with Congress. On the management side, Laird gave the military department 
secretaries and the JCS a more influential role in the development of budgets and force 
levels, but he also returned to the use of service program and budget ceilings (fixed shares) 
and required services to program within these ceilings. This concept of ceilings or “top-
line” endured for most of the next 40 years and still influences DOD budget requests 
today, as services are expected to balance their program and budget against the total 
obligational authority they are given at various stages in the planning and budget process.  
Laird sought to provide a better balance between military and civilian judgment in the 
defense decision-making process by providing better and earlier strategic and fiscal 
guidance to the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Feltes suggests that the result of 
Laird's emphasis on decentralized management was that responsibility for military 
planning was shifted back to the military services, and the role of OSD Systems Analysis 
was de-emphasized. While no abrupt shifts were made, the Laird era was marked by a 
steady and persistent shift away from McNamara’s emphasis on centralization of DOD 
decision making under the Secretary of Defense (Feltes, 1976; Armed Forces 
Management. 1969). 
 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 
It may be argued that the creation of the defense department in 1947-49 never really took 
hold in that, by and large, the military departments continued to go their separate ways 
within the envelope of the Department of Defense until the reforms of the 1960s and, to 
some extent, until implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (Thompson and 
Jones, 1994: 78-79, 246). In the 1950s, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower both fought 
arguably losing battles to strengthen the role of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the JCS (Thompson and Jones, 1994: 51-53).  
By 1981, the sitting JCS Chairman, USMC Gen. David Jones was writing that the 
system was broken and asking Congress to fix it (Jones, 1982). The fact that Gen. Jones as 
CJCS was voicing such criticisms was in itself very significant (Chiarelli, 1993:71). In 
1982, Gen. David C. Jones (1982) suggested that because of the decentralized and 
fragmented resource allocation process driven by parochial service loyalties, there was 
always more program than budget to buy it; that the focus was always on service 
programs; that changes were always marginal when perhaps better analysis would have led 
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to more sweeping changes; that it was impossible to focus on critical cross-service needs; 
and the result was that an amalgamation of service needs prevailed at the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff level.  
General Jones argued that staff to the Chairman of the JCS was so small that the 
Chairman could focus only on a few issues. The result was that the defense budget was 
driven by the desires of the services (usually for more programs and money), rather than 
by a well-integrated JCS plan. In addition, he argued that all of this undercut the authority 
of not only the JCS but the entire unified command structure established in the Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1958 (Thompson and Jones, 1994: 51-53). General Jones noted this 
was particularly evident in acquisition, where weapons systems met performance goals 
70% of the time, but schedules 15% of the time, and cost goals 10% of the time. General 
Jones later explained: 
 
The lack of discipline in the budget system prevents making the very tough choices of 
what to do and what not to do. Instead, strong constituencies in the Pentagon, Congress, 
and industry support individual programs, while the need for overall defense 
effectiveness and efficiency is not adequately addressed.” (Jones, 1996: 27). 
 
In 1986 Congress passed a sweeping reform plan, commonly referred to as the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act (for its congressional sponsors), over the ardent objections of many 
in the Pentagon, including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (Locher, 1996: 10; 
Locher, 2002) who thought it would break apart the DOD management system. The 
legislation is too complex to detail here, but among other things it strengthened the hand of 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as chief military advisor and spokesman to the 
Secretary of Defense and to the President, provided the CJCS with a larger staff and 
identified important phases in the PPBS process where the JCS would play in setting 
requirements and reviewing the plans of other players. It established the national command 
authority to run from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified commanders 
in chief (CINCs). This increased their formal authority so that rather than using whatever 
forces the military services would allow them to use in their geographical area, the unified 
CINCs had war fighting and command responsibilities and the military service roles were 
to provide them with the wherewithal to do so (Thompson and Jones, 1994: 51-53, 79, 
223-224). This distinction clearly put the military services in the role of training people 
and providing personnel and equipment for the warfighting missions of the geographically 
based unified command CINC’s. Goldwater-Nichols also created the position of Vice-
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Generally, the officers who have served in this spot 
have been strong innovators and, through various committee structures, have had a 
substantial impact on the resource planning process within DOD.  
Goldwater-Nichols also emphasized the requirement for joint command officer duty 
assignment. Before Goldwater-Nichols, JCS and joint command assignments were viewed 
as almost career-ending assignments, thus many of the best officers tried to avoid them. 
CJCS Jones observed that people serving joint tours did less well in the promotion process 
than those who had not served such tours (Jones, 1996: 28). While implementing it has 
been an evolutionary process, Goldwater-Nichols has changed this perspective – such 
assignments now may be career enhancing. The Act also required all officers to pass 
certain levels of joint proficiency and upwardly mobile officers now believe a joint tour is 
a must.  
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Most importantly, Goldwater-Nichols changed the caliber of advice given to the 
President and Secretary of Defense by the JCS. Former CJCS Army General Shalikashvili 
praised this part of the Act, “...we have broken free from the ‘lowest common 
denominator’ recommendation that so often plagued us in the past.” (Roberts, 1996: 1) 
Shalikashvili indicated there was still room for smoothing the role of the JCS in the 
planning and budgeting cycles, in the national military planning process, and in 
management of officers into joint billets. Nonetheless, it is clear that Goldwater-Nichols is 
a success, as Secretary of Defense Perry noted in 1995, “It dramatically changed the way 
that America’s forces operate by streamlining the command process and empowering the 
Chairman and the unified commanders. These changes paid off in....Desert Storm, in Haiti, 
and today in Bosnia.”(Locher, 1996:15)  
On the resource allocation side, Goldwater-Nichols provides two classes of 
organizations, those who do the warfighting, under the unified command, and those who 
support them, the military departments and services and their own CINCs. The military 
department secretaries hold most of the DOD budget authority, while the service CINCs 
play key roles in programming, with less leverage in budgeting. Most of the combatant 
commands, the unified CINCS, do not have their own budgets (except for their staffs). 
Rather, they use the personnel and weaponry provided them by the military departments 
and services. However, the military CINCs must pass their budget requests through the 
unified command CINCs before they move upward in the budget chain of command to the 
Pentagon. Prior to the mid-1990s this review by the unified command staffs used to be pro 
forma but it has become a real review in many unified commands, e.g., CINCPAC review 
of CINCPACFLT budget proposals. The Special Operations Forces command, 
headquartered at McDill Air Force base in Florida, has its own sizable (and increasing) 
budget, but SOF budgets still are small compared to the military department budgets.  
The unified CINCs also have had an opportunity to identify requirements in the PPBS 
process and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the responsibility to advise the 
Secretary of Defense to certify the merit of these requirements as well as how well the 
budgets of the military departments satisfy the unified CINC needs. The JCS Chairman 
also can submit alternative recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to meet unified 
CINC needs in the budget. In this matter, the Secretary of Defense is the final arbiter of 
what the military departments get in their budgets. The unified and service CINCs both 
have opportunities to give input to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the PPBES planning 
process for development of the National Military Strategy, and in the final draft of the 
defense guidance which leads to the POM process. In the POM process, the service CINCs 
make inputs by providing their Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) that indicate their top war 
fighting needs (important information for the JCS and unified CINCs). Military service 
CINCs may indicate program deficiencies that exist and make recommendations to fix 
deficiencies to both the JCS and the military service chiefs. The IPLs are a part of the 
programming and budgeting process and are duly considered in several venues in OSD 
and the military departments. More detail on this is provided subsequently in this paper. 
An unresolved tension is evident here as the unified and service CINCs both have been 
criticized as sometimes tending to focus on short-term operational needs, war fighting 
issues, and the O&M accounts that support readiness. Simultaneously, the military 
departments have to keep an eye not only on the short-term, and immediate items and 
issues, but also weapons procurement and re-capitalization issues, such as modernizing the 
aircraft or fleet inventory. Some players in the PPBES process believe this is a healthy 
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tension. Others worry that immediate issues, and some long-term needs, may be slighted. 
DOD is currently in the middle of another significant change as Secretary Rumsfeld 
pursues his goal of transforming both military and business affairs while actively 
employing some part of the operating force in combat situations. This reform is somewhat 
of a return to a more centralized pattern of operations, as explained further below. 
 
TRANSFORMATION OF PPBES: THE NEW PROCESS  
The purpose of PPBES is to provide a systematic and structured approach for allocating 
resources in support of the national security strategy of the U.S.  The ultimate goal of 
the entire PPBES process is to provide the military Commander-in-Chiefs with the best 
mix of forces, equipment and support attainable within resource constraints. Given a 
basic understanding how of PPBES operates in general, we move to a review of changes 
initiated in the period 2001-2004 to significantly modify PPBS into what is now PPBES 
- the result of reforms authorized by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld under the 
administration of President George W. Bush.  
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Figure 2: Summary of New PPBES Cycle 
Source: Secretary of Defense, Management Initiative Decision 913, 2003: 3. 
 
PPBES has four distinct phases, with each phase overlapping the other phases 
(Jones and Bixler, 1992: 19-31). Planning and assessing, for example, are continuous 
and all players in the process understand that decisions made in these phases will affect 
other phases. Because the interrelationships are so complex, players in each phase 
attempt to stay informed on issues in their respective phase as well as issues in other 
phases affecting them. However, the size of DOD and the complexity of the PPBES 
process render this virtually impossible. It is difficult enough for the participants in one 
military service to keep abreast of what is happening in their own process, much less 
what is done in other branches of the military.  
In 2003, the DOD announced significant changes to the PPB system, renaming it the 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System or PPBES (Secretary of 
Defense, 2003a). While the basic structure of PPBS remains, it was changed in three 
important ways. First, the reform merged separate programming and budget review into 
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a single review cycle. Second, it incorporated a biennial budget process. Third, it 
changed the cycle for Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) provision of the top 
level planning information to the military departments and services. The Defense 
Planning Guidance (DPG) that had been issued annually will now become a biennial 
guidance. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will no longer provide the military 
services and defense agencies an annual classified planning document designed to help 
them develop their budget and program requests for the upcoming fiscal year. The move 
away from developing the top-level Defense Planning Guidance each year is part of the 
OSD move toward two-year budget cycles. OSD may prepare “off-year” guidance 
documents reflecting minor strategy changes, according to Management Initiative 
Decision No. 913, issued May 22, 2003 by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz (Secretary of Defense, 2003a).  
The essence of the reform is to place the biennial issuance of the DPG document in 
a two-year cycle within the four years that a Presidential administration has to develop 
its national defense objectives and strategy. A series of documents has in the past 
guided this process, including the annual DPG, the Future Years Defense Program, the 
issuance of each new President's national security strategy, and development of the 
Quadrennial Defense Review for use by DOD and for reporting to Congress. The QDR 
consists of a comprehensive analysis of military readiness, capabilities and force 
structure that helps to provide a reporting framework to permit a newly elected 
administration to develop its spending plan and budget. Since the early 1990s, the QDR 
has become the primary external and one of the major internal statements of policy by 
the Secretary of Defense. 
On February 3, 2003, DOD Comptroller Dov Zakheim presented the new DOD 
biennial budget part of the reform with the release of the President Bush's Fiscal Year 
2004 defense budget request. Zakheim indicated that DOD would use the off years 
when budgets would not be prepared from scratch to examine how well DOD was 
executing its programs and dollars (Zakheim,  2003; Secretary of Defense, 2003a). He 
noted that as of this budget (FY 2004) FY-05 would be an “off year” in which only 
significant revisions to the budget would be requested from Congress. This meant that 
the budget process conducted during the summer and fall of 2003 to prepare the 
FY2005 budget would be significantly changed. For example, DOD will not prepare the 
Program Objective Memoranda (POM) or budget estimates for FY-05. Instead, OSD 
will use estimates for FY 2005 as they were estimated in the FY 2004 budget and 
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), which covers FY 2004 to FY 2009. An 
updating mechanism has been created for the off-years, e.g. FY05.  
Military Departments and CINCS may create Program Change Proposals (PCPs) to 
affect the POM and Budget Change Proposals (BCPs) to speak to new budget needs. 
The PCPs allow for fact of life changes to the previous year’s POM; they are meant to 
be few and of relatively large size. Guidance for 2003 indicated the PCPs had to exceed 
a set dollar threshold or have serious policy and programmatic implications. For 
example, in 2003 the Navy submitted only three PCPs, one worth $100 million that 
involved 450 line items. The Navy would submit only three PCP’s in 2003. For all of 
DOD the number of PCPs was estimated to be about 120.  For the CINCs, the PCPs are 
a new tool provided them in the PPBE process, but like the military departments, they 
have to suggest offsets. For example, if a CINC wants to increase force protection in 
one area at a certain cost, he has to suggest weakening force protection in another area 
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as an offset for the increase. This is meant to be a zero-sum game. Changes have to be 
accompanied by offsets or bill-payers. As is usual with any offset procedure, claimants 
who submit either PCPs or BCPs take the risk that the offsets they suggest will be 
accepted, but the accompanying change proposals the offsets were intended to fund 
might not be. In such cases, the offset reveals a pot of money for a lower priority item 
that might be directed to another area. The budget change proposals were expected to be 
more numerous but smaller. They too would be largely fact of life changes (e.g. cost 
increases, schedule delays, new congressional directives) and would have to be paid for 
by offsets. Although the individual BCP need not be offset, the package of offsets 
provided by a Military Department has to be offset and provide a zero balance change. 
The FY 2006 budget request will be prepared completely anew, marking the first 
biennial POM and budget in the new two-year cycle. A Defense Planning Guidance will 
be prepared by OSD to guide the FY 2006 process. 
In April 2003 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld canceled the 2005 DPG due to 
the budget process changes announced in February by DOD Comptroller Zakheim to 
concentrate Pentagon analytical resources on determining whether Saddam Hussein's 
ouster and the progression of the war on terrorism had mandated additional changes in 
the Bush administration national defense strategy. In addition to prioritizing how OSD 
believes military dollars should be spent in upcoming years, the DPG typically calls for 
studies on top issues and indicates new strategies to be undertaken. Rumsfeld’s action 
violated no rules, as the Secretary of Defense is not legally required to prepare an 
annual Defense Planning Guidance.  
 
PPBES: Year One 
Management Initiative Decision 913 sets out a two-year budget and planning cycle 
within the framework of the four years in a Presidential administration. Year one 
requires “review and refinement” of the previous President's strategy and plans, 
including only limited changes in programs and budgets, an early national security 
strategy, and an “off-year DPG.” As stated in MID-913, “The off-year DPG will be 
issued at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense… The off-year DPG will not 
introduce major changes to the defense program, except as specifically directed by the 
Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense… However, a small and discrete number of 
programming changes will be required to reflect real world changes and as part of the 
continuing need to align the defense program with the defense strategy,” (Secretary of 
Defense, 2003a: 5). A major objective of the off-year guidance will be to provide the 
planning and analysis necessary to identify major program issues for the next DPG. One 
of the benefits of the new four-year cycle is that it fits the PPB process into the electoral 
cycle. Incoming administrations usually struggle to get their people on board in the first 
year and significant defense policy changes usually do not come until later. The new 
cycle recognizes this reality. Significant events do happen in year one. The National 
Security Strategy is issued at about mid-year and the Quadrennial Defense review 
begins shortly thereafter and is issued early in Year Two. These provide significant 
guidance for defense strategy and resource allocation. 
 
PPBES: Year Two 
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Year two in the new four-year framework is more intense in that the military 
departments and services and OSD will conduct full program, planning, budget and 
execution reviews to formalize the President's defense posture and strategy, including 
the resource portion of the strategy. In addition to a Quadrennial Defense Review issued 
early in the year, the second year will include a full, “on-year” Defense Planning 
Guidance (DPG), issued in May and designed to implement the QDR results. 
Previously, the QDR had been issued on 30 September in the first year of a Presidential 
administration. However, in the FY 2003 Defense Authorization Act, Congress changed 
the QDR reporting requirement to the second year to provide new DOD leadership more 
time for analysis and preparation. Senior defense officials had argued to Congress that 
the requirement to submit a QDR in the first year was too much to ask of a new 
administration barely through the rigorous congressional process for confirmation of 
presidential appointees to head the DOD and military departments. Year two will see 
then a full POM and a full budget build. These result in a full FYDP build. 
 
PPBES: Year Three 
The new planning and budget process specifies that year three be used for “execution” 
of the President's defense plan and budget agenda as provided in the QDR and the 
previous year's DPG. Year three corresponds with FY 2005 in the budget cycle and 
could include an “off-year” DPG if so desired by the Secretary of Defense. This off-
year guidance could task new studies, or incorporate fact-of-life changes in acquisition 
programs including increased costs or schedule delays as well as congressionally 
mandated changes. In May 2003, Zakheim indicated that no 2005 DPG was to be 
prepared under the Bush administration and Rumsfeld. However, the Presidential 
elections of 2004 could change this plan. Year three is a year of refinement of 
objectives and metrics with only the most necessary program or budget change 
proposals considered. 
Careful examination of DOD execution of dollars and plans is a critical part of the 
new planning and budgeting process. Traditionally, budget execution has been left 
primarily to the military departments. However, the revised process provides OSD with 
greater opportunity to examine and critique the budget execution decisions of the 
military departments and services. Zakheim reported in February a widespread 
agreement in the DOD not to return to a comprehensive annual budget and program 
review; rather the intent was to use the off year to measure the “burn rate” (rate of 
spending) in an execution review (Zakheim, 2003). To this end, the comptroller said the 
review would include asking questions such as how money is being spent, if it should 
be moved to other areas and accounts, and the results achieved from execution.  
An important budget changed initiated by the Bush administration announced in 
February 2003 and subsequently by the DOD Comptroller is implementation of 
“performance-based budgeting,” to focus more on the costs of achieving desired 
military and programmatic outcomes, rather than concentrating budget review on the 
details of program administration and production. The driving military concept behind 
performance-based-budgeting (PBB) is the concept of “effects-based capabilities” for 
war fighting. The effects-based approach focuses on desired end results from a military 
action rather than the military action itself. Under this concept, military commanders 
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specify the results, such as capture of territory, in addition to the amounts and types of 
forces needed to achieve the outcome.  
 
PPBES: Year Four 
Year four in the budget and planning cycle is characterized in MID-913 as the point 
where the achievements of a four-year Presidential administration are assessed. This 
year will include preparation of a full DPG to refine the alignment between Presidential 
strategy and the DOD program and budget. As usual, the DPG will initiate and guide 
the cycle of military department and service POM and budget preparation, review and 
submission (for FY 2006). Then, the next full PPBES cycle will encompass Fiscal 
Years 2006 to 2011. 
Part of the 2003 reform was intended to accelerate and improve the acquisition 
process. In April 2002, Defense Planning Guidance study #20 (Secretary of Defense, 
2002b) concluded that the resource requirements process frequently produced stove-
piped systems that were not necessarily based on required capabilities and incorporated 
decisions from a single service perspective. The study found that the acquisition process 
did not necessarily develop requirements in the context of how the joint force would 
fight. Rather, requirements tended to be more service-focused. Moreover, duplication of 
efforts was apparent in the less visible and smaller acquisition programs. The study 
observed that the current culture aimed for the 100% (perfect) solution and this resulted 
in lengthy times to field weapons. In addition, the process was still found to lack 
prioritization of joint war fighting demands. Ongoing reform here resulted in reshaping 
of the JROC process so that decisions would be better set up for JROC to make its 
decision by two new oversight committees reporting to it, headed by flag officers and 
focused on functional areas. This is an on-going part of the 2003 reform and is 
indicative of Secretary Rumsfeld’s interest in joint operations, joint war fighting, and a 
quicker acquisitions process.  
In summary, the programming-budgeting changes that constituted a redesigned 
PPBE system began in August of 2001 when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announced 
that the POM and Budget cycle would be operated contemporaneously to speed up the 
review and decision process (Rumsfeld, 2001). Further reforms were announced by 
DOD in February and May of 2003. By this time, military departments had already 
begun to transform their planning and budgeting systems. It may be observed that the 
comprehensiveness of the changes will take several years to implement throughout 
DOD. However, the cycle for adopting the innovation is likely to be shorter for military 
departments and services that already had begun reforms on their own, e.g., the Navy. 
 
TRANSFORMATION OF PPBES AND INCREASED CENTRALIZATION OF 
AUTHORITY: ISSUES AND CONSEQUENCES 
The PPBES and budget changes implemented under the Bush administration in 2003 
are the most comprehensive since the system was established in the early 1960s. The 
drive to move to a refined system was impelled by many of the factors analyzed 
subsequently in this paper. In short, for years the PPBS process had been criticized as 
duplicative, unnecessarily complicated, and wasteful of staff time and energy (Jones and 
Bixler, 1992, Puritano, 1981). The administration of George H. W. Bush (1988-1992) 
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seriously considered reform of PPBS in the period 1990 and 1991 as part of its Defense 
Management Report initiative, but the challenge to realign defense strategy and the 
overall confusion caused by the end of the Cold war understandably took precedence 
over these reforms. It would take a decade for a Presidential administration to come 
back to the issue of PPBS reform. Subsequently, we delve more deeply into the rational 
for performance-based budgeting (PBB) and how it is intended to operate. 
With respect to long-range DOD planning in the first phase of PPBES, we may 
observe that during the 1990s it was clear from the beginning that the shift from a Cold 
war mentality to a new framework was preceding slowly. The gist of what was 
necessary in the post-Cold war world did not ever seem clear, despite all the discussion 
of asymmetric threat and successive preparation and reviews of the QDR. The terrorist 
attack of September 11, 2001 ended this period of doubt and confused reflection.  
It is routinely acknowledged that the planning component has been the weakest part 
of PPBS for decades. Part of this is due to the contingent nature of threat assessment 
while other impediments include the sheer volume of information and absence of data 
coordination. In order for DOD to plan to counter threat effectively, it seems to us that a 
capabilities-based planning process within PPBES, rather than a theater-based approach, 
is one way to tear loose from the old bipolar geographic analyses that focused on the 
USSR, potential enemies in Asia or elsewhere. Instead, it is critical to ask what 
capabilities the U.S. needs to meet threats wherever they occur, especially given that the 
terrorist threat has a personal or group basis less geographically bound.  
The deployment of U.S. forces since September 11, 2001 illustrates new concepts in 
joint operation, the use of Special Forces and the application of joint forces in unique 
ways, supported by traditional forces using traditional doctrines. Nonetheless, it is a 
new mix. Much of the transformation in military affairs that has been ongoing since the 
mid-1990s is driven by new threats that seem to emerge almost daily. All this points to 
the ties between changes in military war fighting and PPBES planning. 
It is obvious that important changes have been made in the DOD planning and 
budgeting process. The simultaneous execution of the POM and budget review and its 
consolidation into one data base is an important change. In the old system, a good POM 
could still be lost on the way to the final budget. In addition, sometimes the budget 
process ended up doing a lot or reprogramming and re-making of decisions that would 
have been better done in a POM exercise. For example, the 2003 POM process started 
by doing a pricing review of the shipbuilding budget. This is a budget drill and in the 
old PPB system would have been done in the budget process long after the POM had 
been completed. Observers comment that when such drills (re-pricing the shipbuilding 
account for inflation etc.) result in a big bill that has to be paid, it is good to have that 
bill considered and paid up front at the beginning of the process in the POM where large 
dollar changes can be made more easily. They also felt that doing the POM and budget 
simultaneously should result in fewer surprises and less re-programming of changes to 
the POM in the budget process than there used to be. They felt that the process should 
be quicker, but less linear, a layered process rather than a sequential process. The 
routing of all products of the POM and the budget into one database was seen to be a 
significant move to help resolve some of this added complexity.  
Secondly, the outcome focus of the process is an important change. Secretary 
Rumsfeld has emphasized outcomes and the Navy approach illustrates this concern in 
two ways. The procurement accounts are focused around the outcomes each weapon 
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system bought will provide and the performance models for steaming hours and flying 
hours are also outcome focused. As has been stated above, this covers almost 90% of 
the Navy budget. Nevertheless, Congress still appropriates by line item and DOD has to 
be able to translate capabilities into budget items and make winning arguments for those 
translations. The fact is that budget lines (line-items) make it easy for Congress to buy 
things and what has not changed is where the power of the purse is located. In the words 
of one DOD budget player, “…there are a lot of changes, but what has not been 
changed is the Constitution. Changes will end when they bump into things that are 
Constitutional. The appropriation process is still a congressional process and changes in 
the pentagon process have to be responsive to the needs of Congress. The menu of 
changes the pentagon can pursue is not unlimited.” 
Thirdly, the new model put the Secretary of Defense into the process at the early 
stages, “in the driver’s seat,” in the words of one budget official. Decisions in the new 
PPBES are intended to reach the Secretary before the decision has become a foregone 
conclusion, while options are still open, and while important and large-scale changes 
can still be made. When the Secretary of Defense inputs come at the end of the stream 
of decisions, some decisions that could be taken get pre-empted simply because they 
might cause too much breakage in other programs or because everyone has already 
become committed to the likely outcomes of the decision. Secretary Rumsfeld had a 
clear interest in transformation, but not all communities within the defense 
establishment were equally committed or committed at all to Rumsfeld’s vision. As we 
have noted, inserting the Secretary of Defense in the decision process early stands up so 
long as history proves the decisions the Secretary of Defense make are right. While this 
is true whether the Secretary of Defense input is early or late, inserting the Secretary of 
Defense early in the PPBES process puts a larger burden of proof on the Secretary of 
Defense. Veteran observers see these changes as an evolving process, cautioning 
officers bound for the pentagon in a couple of years not to bother memorizing the new 
process until they get there since it has changed significantly since 2001 and will 
continue to change.  
Lastly, the new emphasis on execution seems an important change, but it is too early 
to speculate on how this will turn out. It seems clear that no one wants to be viewed as 
decreasing military effectiveness in the name of saving dollars. Through 2003 a 
continuing theme of administration critics was that the U.S. was trying to do Iraq “on 
the cheap” with not enough troops and not enough of the right kind of troops. If the new 
emphasis on execution becomes a code word for efficiency and this is parsed into 
“doing things on the cheap,” then the emphasis on execution will not have important or 
long lasting effects. As we have indicated in analysis of the durability of defense 
financial management problems, this is a difficult problem to resolve, but one that must 
be addressed. 
The 2003 budget process within DOD was dramatically changed. The 2003 process 
exemplifies incrementalism triumphant. Only changes to the POM and the budget were 
brought forward in 2003. This is a dramatic change from past. Renown budgetary expert 
Aaron Wildavsky developed the concept of incrementalism in the 1960s (Wildavsky, 
1964) but ignored defense budgeting, but DOD appears to have gone to school on 
Wildavsky. The result of the 2003 budget process is that unless a budget change 
proposal is explicitly approved, then a unit’s budget is the same as it was the previous 
year; in Wildavsky’s terms, the base is re-appropriated. Thus, if a unit does well in the 
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on-year cycle (second and fourth year), it may carry some ‘fat’ through the off-years. 
This would seem to intensify the struggles during the on-year processes, making the 
stakes higher. Success is rewarded for two years and failure is doubly penalized, i.e., 
remember to change in the off year, off-sets have to be offered up, so the only way to 
get better in the off-year is by giving up something else. In the off-year cycles, only 
changes to the base are explicitly considered, both in the Program Change Proposals for 
the POM (big dollar numbers, but fewer of them) and Budget Change Proposals for the 
budget (more, but smaller dollars). However, there is an interesting twist to this. 
Changes may come from anywhere someone has an issue, e.g. the military services, 
combatant commanders, and Assistant and Undersecretaries of Defense.  
We have explained that reform of PPBES has been in progress in DOD for a long time, 
most recently since 2001. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld changed the process in 
August 2001 and appointed committees to recommend further changes. Changing the PPB 
system is not a new idea. One change recommended by PPBS observers for more than a 
decade has been to simplify the process (Jones and Bixler, 1992; Joint DOD/GAO 
Working Group on PPBS, 1983; Puritano, 1981). Other options have included increasing 
the assets and time devoted to threat assessment, improving the quality of integration of 
threat information, and reducing the time devoted to programming so that this cycle 
consists of essentially the "end game" of the current programming process, and multi-year 
budgeting. While the 2001 transformation to merge POM and budget review represented a 
laudable incremental reform, changes made in 2001 and 2003 are far more sweeping.  
The rational for combining POM and budget review was essentially that too much 
time was being spent on POM preparation and approval than was worth the effort. 
Placing more emphasis on the "end game" of programming seemed a good idea. The 
end-game is the phase in programming at which major decisions are made, e.g., about 
weapons systems acquisition and force structure changes. Shortening the programming 
phase was recommended to the Rumsfeld study committees to eliminate the time 
consuming process of preparing the POM de novo for each POM cycle from the field 
level up. Not only had so much time been devoted to POM preparation in the past, but 
critics also felt that this time was, essentially, wasted because most of the POM was 
composed of virtually the same information used for previous POM submissions. The 
criticism was that, much like zero-based budgeting, building the POM from the bottom 
up for each cycle created great workload without producing much that was new for 
decision makers.  
The key to effective programming is to make the right decisions on major asset 
acquisition and force structure changes. The other important task accomplished by 
programming is to align the various assets, including manpower, so they are budgeted in 
a coordinated way, making assets available together, coinciding with the time they are 
needed for war fighting. As of 2002, this important part of programming was essentially 
merged with the budget review phase of PPBES so that budgeting has become a longer-
range process, focusing more on a multiple year period rather than the one year cycle 
that is used by Congress with considerable inefficiency. Problems may be anticipated 
with any comprehensive change in PPBES or other major system directed from the level 
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The lag time for full and satisfactory 
implementation of DOD-level macro changes in planning, programming and budgeting 
is probably two to four years, although many wrinkles will be worked out by the 
military departments after the first new cycle has been completed. However, it is 
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understood by seasoned observers of such change that the solutions and new processes 
developed by the military departments will differ by service and therefore some degree 
of incompatibility between different service solutions is inevitable despite the intention 
of DOD decision makers to prevent this from happening. DOD prefers uniformity but 
this is not possible, and probably not desirable, given the highly differentiated resource 
management systems and processes used by the respective military departments and 
services. In defense of diversity it may be observed that any system developed by DOD 
should serve the needs of its constituents, i.e., the military departments and services. 
From the view of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, diversity in implementation of 
reform is an annoyance at best, and a direct violation of authority at worst, to be 
illuminated and eliminated. However, the power of OSD is not such that it can mandate 
what the military departments and services, as semi-autonomous operating entities, will 
do in implementation of any DOD directed reform, or congressionally mandated reform 
for that matter, e.g., the CFO Act or the Government Performance and Results Act.  
This observation is not based on examination of reforms (e.g., Management 
Initiative Decision 913) in formal lines of authority and management control in the 
Department of Defense, nor on how differences in old and new systems are depicted in 
highly detailed, multi-colored graphics and tabular “wiring diagrams” of the type 
typically used in Pentagon-level briefing slides. Rather, it is based upon examination of 
how process changes actually are incorporated into existing systems in the real world of 
comptroller-based financial management in a highly decentralized and diverse 
organization – the U.S. Department of Defense. It is axiomatic to observe that no matter 
what reforms successive Defense military department secretaries wish to implement 
change, what will be done in reality is more likely to be a matter of evolution of existing 
military department and service-based systems rather than transformation to a single 
centralized system. In practice, DOD cannot be centrally managed and controlled, and 
any assumption that such control is possible is a combination of wishful thinking and 
fantasy.  
In conclusion, the PPBS process has been employed by Presidential administrations 
served by Defense Secretaries from McNamara in the 1960s, Laird in the 1970s, Caspar 
Weinberger and Frank Carlucci in the 1980s, to Dick Cheney, Les Aspin, William Perry, 
William Cohen and Donald Rumsfeld in the 1990s and into the new millennium. DOD has 
managed the constant evolution of PPBS while keeping its basic structure relatively stable. 
However, the pace of evolutionary change quickened under Secretary Rumsfeld as a part 
of the overall DOD transformation in business affairs initiative. 
 
THE PUSH FOR PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS-ORIENTED 
TRANSFORMATION FOR DOD AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
Significant management reform has been undertaken over the past fifteen years under the 
administrations of President George H.W. Bush in the period 1988-1992, the Clinton 
administration from 1993 to 2000, and the administration of George W. Bush beginning in 
2001. Reform also has been sponsored by Congress. The Chief Financial Officers Act 
(CFO Act) was passed by Congress in 1990. The most important pieces of legislation 
related to performance management arguably are the Government Performance and 
Results Act (see GPRA, 2003) passed by Congress in 1993 followed by the Government 
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Management Results Act (see GMRA, 2003). GPRA as implemented in the executive 
branch under the direction of the President’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
has driven performance management reform for a decade. A little known fact about GPRA 
is that while it was enacted by Congress, it was written in final form before passage by 
OMB staff (Breul, 2004a; see also 2003; 2004b). 
During the Clinton administration the National Performance Review (NPR) called for 
performance-oriented organizations and mission-driven, results-oriented budgets. In 
August 2001 President George W. Bush introduced the initial management and budget 
reforms of his administration, among these was linking performance to budgets. The 
Government Performance and Results Act authorized pilot experimentation with what is 
referred to here as responsibility budgeting and accounting and reporting (RBA) by all 
departments and agencies of the federal government. The Office of Management and 
Budget developed means for accumulating results from these pilot cases during the 1990s 
and OMB and the agencies reported these outcomes to the oversight committees of 
Congress.  
The Defense Management Report Initiatives under President George Bush and 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney undertaken from 1989 to 1992, and the NPR both 
stimulated considerable effort aimed at accounting, financial management and 
performance measurement reform in the Department of Defense. Greater progress was 
made in DOD under Bush and Cheney in the early 1990s (e.g., introduction of 
reimbursable transaction accounting and budgeting) than during the Clinton 
administration, but both successes and failures resulted from these initiatives. It is clear 
that government-wide progress has not been rapid. As with most large and complex 
organizations, the U.S. federal government has been slow to change. The impetus to 
change presently emanates from a combination of the CFO Act, the GPRA and 
Presidential initiatives.  
The CFO Act requires double-entry bookkeeping and accrual accounting, neither of 
which are standard practice in the U.S. federal government. To receive a clear audit report 
from the Inspectors General who perform CFO audits, these accounting changes need to be 
implemented in federal department and agency accounting systems. However, few federal 
agencies can comply with either the double-entry or accrual requirements, and there is 
resistance to investing to do so given that the federal budget and congressional 
appropriation accounting is done primarily on a single entry and cash basis. Changes in 
federal appropriation law and congressional appropriation procedures, at minimum, appear 
to be required to push federal agencies further toward CFO Act compliance. Some 
knowledgeable critics contend that the CFO Act and its implementation are flawed and 
that Congress should start over with it. (Anthony, 2002) 
The GPRA requires strategic planning (SP) and the development of performance 
measures, which have been implemented throughout the government, and linkage between 
SP and resource planning and budgets, which has been tried in DOD with varying success. 
Further, GPRA invited agency experimentation with performance budgets on a voluntary 
basis, to be evaluated by Congress. To date, the results from these experiments have not 
persuaded Congress or the President's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that 
broad application of performance budgeting, using an agency theory-oriented contracting 
system of the type employed in New Zealand and elsewhere, is worth the effort. 
Conversely, agencies report that their own ability to plan and execute programs and to 
justify budgets has been in some instances enhanced as a result of SP and performance 
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measure development -- as required by OMB.  
Few agencies and no departments in total have the capacities in their accounting 
systems and procedures that permit accurate and reliable (or in some cases any) linkage 
between performance or results data and costs or budgets. Consequently, whether the task 
required is reporting costs related to organizational units, functions, accounts and sub-
accounts or workload for the CFO Act, or cost related to performance (e.g., for results) for 
GPRA, there has been little broad-scale success in the short-term for most of the federal 
government, including the Department of Defense. However, as a result of OMB use of 
the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) in program and budget review starting 
in 2001 and the better business practice initiatives in DOD, progress may be more rapid in 
the mid-2000s (see OMB, 2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b; 2003a; 2003b; 2003c).  
A significant recent transformation initiative in DOD is the Defense Enterprise 
Accounting Management System (DEAMS); a joint transformation project between the 
U.S. Air Force, Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) and the U.S. 
Transportation command. This aggressive program promises to deliver on many of the 
needed shortfalls in the sponsoring organizations and, if successful, may be considered as 
the common finance and accounting system for the entire DOD. During a recent 
conference (Defense Finance 2005) attended by many key DOD and government financial 
leaders DEAMS was heralded as a leading-edge model for reform. That said, we are a year 
or two from clear determination of whether or not this program will deliver as promised. 
As provided on the DEAMS website (http://deams.transcom.mil/), the following 
description suggests the scope and breadth of the program’s objectives: 
 
DEAMS is a financial management initiative that will transform business and financial 
management processes and systems to provide accurate, reliable, and timely business 
information to support effective business decision making for U.S. Transportation 
Command, Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), the U.S. Air Force and 
eventually, other agencies within the Department of Defense. 
 
Performance-Oriented Budgeting, Budget Caps and Multiple Year Financing 
Under the administration of George W. Bush there has been increased emphasis on 
performance and results-oriented program and budget review, and this has implications 
for DOD in that defense programs have been pressed by DOD leadership to demonstrate 
results relative to costs, or what may be termed "value for money." This emphasis is 
likely to become more pronounced in the next few years under any Presidential 
administration.  
Budget reform initiatives were announced by President George W. Bush with 
support from his Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the FY 2003 President's 
Budget delivered to Congress in February 2002. This budget introduced "performance-
based budgeting" to link funding to performance measures and accomplishments for 
federal departments and agencies. The Office of Management and Budget targeted 
review to improve performance in five areas of management: human resources 
management productivity, competitive sourcing (i.e., contracting out), financial 
management, e-government, and integration of performance measurement and budgets. 
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In initiating performance-based budgeting for the federal government, the Bush 
administration has attempted to bring the U.S. into line with many of the more 
progressive national practices around the world. Other nations including New Zealand, 
Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the United Kingdom have employed performance 
and output or results-oriented budgeting practices over the past decade or more (Jones, 
2002a; 2002b; 2003). Furthermore, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on February 5, 2002, then OMB Director Mitchell Daniels noted that the 
reform interests of the Bush administration were not limited to performance budgeting. 
While stressing the importance in evaluating programs on the basis of achievements, 
Daniels also expressed approval with members of the committee who asked him about 
other budget reforms (Daniels, 2002). 
The first issue addressed was whether there was a need for new budget "caps" or 
spending ceilings given that the caps previously enacted in the early 1990s and re-
endorsed in the Balance Budget Act of 1997 had expired. Also mentioned was the fact 
that Congress often exceeded the caps even when they were in force. Daniels agreed 
with some members of the committee that new caps should be enacted to control 
congressional proclivities to spend (Daniels, 2002). 
A second and related issue was whether new spending caps should include a ceiling 
for national defense spending. Daniels indicated the strong preference of the 
administration against a cap on national defense appropriations in a period when the 
nation was at war with the forces of terrorism around the globe (Daniels, 2002). In 
rejecting the idea of a cap for defense spending, the testimony of Director Daniels 
conformed to the views expressed by Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank Alan 
Greenspan in testimony to Congress in the same week. (Greenspan, 2002) When asked 
directly by members of the House Budget Committee whether caps should be reinstated 
for the discretionary (non-entitlement) portion of the federal budget, Greenspan 
responded that he believed new caps were needed in all areas but national defense. Both 
Greenspan and Daniels reflected the priorities of the Bush administration in placing the 
war on terrorism as the highest priority in policy and budgeting. 
In response to questions from congressional members, Daniels also expressed the 
interest of the administration in exploring biennial budgeting and budgeting by results 
contracting (Daniels, 2002). While the biennial budget initiative was not an element of 
the President's 2003 budget, the fact that the Bush administration expressed interest in 
biennial budgeting appeared to open the door to discussion of even more ambitious 
reform, e.g., with multi-year budgets similar to the types of budget processes in use in 
the United Kingdom, where budgets are enacted for a three-year period and reviewed 
biennially, and in Australia, where three year "running cost" budgets were used in the 
1990s with some success. Australia has, as of this writing, shifted to an even longer 
five-year cycle of budget enactment and review. Budget critics have long argued the 
inefficiency of the annual budget cycle (McCaffery and Jones, 2001: 87-90). 
Annual budgeting satisfies congressional preferences for a cycle that provides 
maximum opportunity to reward constituents with spending largess. In fact, as political 
scientists have observed for decades, virtually all-congressional politics is local politics, 
i.e., driven by the need to satisfy the special interests of members' districts or states. 
And while this opportunity provides the benefits of democratic representation and 
responsiveness, it does not lend itself well to expenditure control, fiscal discipline, or 
efficiency in either spending or program performance. Rather, annual spending 
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encourages the behavior well known to both budget officials and academics, i.e., spend 
it or lose it. Further, because the problems that governments face are never constrained 
to periods of one year, spending demand is, given the nature of service demand, always 
multi-year in character. The annual budget cycle produces all kinds of perversities and 
strategic misrepresentation in budgeting. (Jones and Euske, 1991) Perhaps the best 
recognized is the end of year spend-out phenomenon where real spending priorities 
often are ignored in the rush to spend or obligate every dollar available, regardless of 
whether the items purchased or the services provided are really needed. 
Unfortunately, the annual spending cycle encourages exactly the types of behavior 
that Congress, the Executive and various audit agencies of the federal government, 
including the General Accounting Office, indicate is abhorrent. The incentives implicit 
in the spend it or lose it approach to budgeting push otherwise prudent budget executors 
to the brink of Anti-Deficiency Act violations, including spending for things not 
authorized or appropriated by Congress, or spending from budget accounts dedicated to 
one purpose for other purposes not authorized by law. And the obvious incentive from 
annual spendouts is to over-spend rather than under-spend if what is not expended is 
likely to be lost in the next budget. During Defense Finance 2005, when Dov Zakheim 
was asked what he thought could be done to change this perceived ‘spend it or lose it’ 
culture in DOD, the former Comptroller suggested that it was much more than just 
culture and in fact he would argue for a two year appropriation.  
For these and other reasons nations, including those mentioned above, have moved 
to multi-year budget appropriations and execution, providing programs the authority to 
over or under-spend in any one particular year so long as spending conforms to totals 
appropriated for the longer term period of years. This provides greater opportunity for 
budget and program managers to execute budgets more efficiently, with greater 
attention to management "steering" to achieve desired results and increased flexibility to 
adjust short and medium spending plans to fit the demands of efficient budget 
execution.  
Moving to multi-year budgeting would not represent a radical change to DOD for 
two reasons. First, as explained in this paper, DOD and the military departments and 
services already manage at least three budget years simultaneously. Second, because 
many budget accounts for national defense already are funded on a multiple year basis 
(RDT&E, and weapons acquisition accounts for example), moving all of them to a 
multiple year structure does not require serious change in the way that DOD budgets for 
national defense. The degree of change required of Congress is another matter. While it 
would be desirable to have Congress move to a multi-year budget process for defense, 
this was not a necessary condition for change to PPBES by DOD. DOD can move to 
multi-year budgeting and Congress can continue to appropriate annually portions of the 
multi-year budget it receives from DOD. The point is that DOD can and has decided to 
reform PPBES itself, and then attempt to gain congressional support and approval for 
the change by demonstrating that the reform produces better decisions and reduces the 
costs of decision making. 
Related to multi-year budgeting for results is the issue of contracting for results. 
Contracts for results written into budgets in other nations have included agreements 
between legislative bodies and program agencies to produce a set amount of outputs or 
outcomes (e.g., in New Zealand) or contracts within the Executive Branch between 
control agencies such as OMB and departments and agencies. In the UK, the 
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Department of the Treasury engages in such contracting under the oversight of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet and Parliament. However, officials of the Treasury do the 
real work of holding service providing agencies to their contracts (Jones, 2001a). There 
are other examples of contracting for results in budgeting in Australia, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Denmark and elsewhere (Wanna et al, 2003). 
It is not yet possible to evaluate comprehensively the success achieved in 
performance-based budget review under the Bush administration in DOD and 
elsewhere. However, there is some evidence to assess the efforts and success of OMB 
with this approach given that by 2003 more than 20% of federal programs and virtually 
all departments and agencies were complying with OMB budget submission 
requirements. As noted, for FY 2004, 231 programs were graded using the Program 
Assessment Rating Tool (PART) system. However, whether and to what extent the 
PART review improved department efficiency and effectiveness is uncertain. What can 
be said is that OMB used PART to attempt to reduce budgets in some instances, which 
is not surprising given this is standard practice as an element of most management and 
performance review techniques employed by executive budget control agencies 
(McCaffery and Jones, 2001: 203-224, 281-320; Jones, 2001a; Wanna et. al., 2003).  
Performance assessment under the Bush administration continued in preparation of 
the FY 2003 and FY 2004 President’s Budgets. Performance review under the Bush 
administration may be viewed as a continuation of a trend begun in the 1990s in OMB 
(Rodriquez, 1996, Daniels, 2001). Budgets have been prepared and analyzed using what 
may be termed performance-based budget review to link funding to performance 
measures and accomplishments for federal programs within departments and agencies. 
The Program Assessment Rating Tool was used by OMB in analysis of 67 programs 
included in the FY 2003 President's Budget. PART was employed to score performance 
in 231 programs (about 20% of total on-budget federal programs) for the President's FY 
2004 Budget. An additional 20% were to be reviewed by OMB in preparation of the FY 
2005 Budget.  
PART scores programs using multi-variable criteria set of approximately 30 
variables that initially (for FY 2003) culminated in what was characterized as a "stop 
light" system: red for failing performance, yellow for marginal performance, and green 
for good performance. For FY 2004 the system expanded the range of grading options 
to five categories: effective, moderately effective, adequate, results not demonstrated, 
and ineffective. For FY 2004 14 programs were rated as effective, 54 moderately 
effective, 34 adequate, 11 ineffective and 118 results not demonstrated. The large 
number in this last category indicates that many programs have not attempted or have 
been unable to develop useful measures of performance. Reporting of the results is 
provided in a separate volume of the President’s budget (OMB, 2003a; 2003c). 
Programs are rated in four areas of performance: program purpose and design, strategic 
planning, program management, and program results.  
The overall objectives of PART are (1) to measure and diagnose program 
performance, (2) to evaluate programs in a systematic, consistent and transparent 
manner, (3) to inform agency and OMB decisions for management, legislative or 
regulatory improvements and budget decisions, (4) to focus on program improvements 
and measure progress against prior year ratings. OMB intends to extend the application 
of PART to all programs in the budget in future budget review. If this is done, it will be 
a time consuming effort for the reviewers who are line budget examiners. Budget 
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analysts are tasked to review specific program, i.e., they assume some degree of 
ownership of the budgets they examine (McCaffery and Jones, 2001: 203-224). 
Consequently, there always is a problem of consistency in application of evaluative 
criteria with executive control agency review of budgets and performance.  
Given this circumstance, the executives and budget staff of programs under review 
would be wise to take Wildavsky’s advice (Wildavsky, 1964: 20-31) to be sensitive to 
the signals about priorities provided to it by budget analysts. Typically, after one or two 
budget reviews by the same analyst, agency budget officials should become attuned to 
the preferences of the analyst and administration he or she serves. To fail to read such 
feedback is to lose competitive advantage in the budget game. The advantage of the 
PART system over previous methods of budget review is that it provides more 
feedback, i.e., more signals on how to achieve a higher rating. Indeed, by 2003 PART 
had become sufficiently institutionalized so that consulting firms inside the beltway 
were offering courses to teach program staff how to improve their scores. With this 
much feedback and assistance it is surprising how many programs were rated for the FY 
2004 Budget as ineffective or results not demonstrated categories (129 or roughly 56% 
of the 231 programs reviewed). 
For FY 2003 and FY 2004 many programs received failing scores -- but 
improvements in some programs were reported for FY 2004. Departments and agencies 
invested staff time and energy to achieving improved ratings in attempt to be rewarded 
in the President's Budget. The key incentive supporting the PART system is the intent of 
OMB directors and staff to integrate performance-scoring with OMB budget review. 
Presumably, programs that improve their ratings are to be rewarded in the budget. The 
advantages of the PART approach appear to be two-fold. First, the scoring is relatively 
easy to understand because it is simple – there are only five categories. Second, PART 
scores are scaled relative to a set of variables that represent the strategic and annual 
planning, management and execution performance by programs according to data 
developed and reported to OMB by agencies. OMB does not provide the data for PART 
reviews. Thus, the opportunity is ever present for programs to score better if they want 
to, and if they are able to measure and quantify results. However, two biases are built 
into any performance rating system in addition to the inevitable issues concerning inter-
rater reliability noted above. First, some program performance results (or outputs) are 
easier to measure and report than others. The second is uncertainty about the 
relationship between achievement on measures and budget decisions. For example, if 
programs solve some of the problems faced by their clientele group (Wildavsky’s term), 
should your budget be increased or reduced? On one hand the argument is to reward 
improvement, but if clientele needs have been satisfied does this indicate a decrease in 
demand for program services and therefore a budget cut? 
Review of the PART system by departments and agencies that have been rated by 
OMB indicated several recurrent criticisms (Jones, 2003). The PART questionnaire 
instrument requires yes or no answers to a number of questions about performance. It 
has been suggested that a better system would have departments and agencies rate their 
answers on a scale, e.g., 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). Scaled data are more amenable to 
analysis than yes/no responses. A second criticism concerned the way OMB defined the 
units of analysis -- as programs instead of departmental or agency administrative 
entities. Some programs defined by OMB were not administered as such by departments 
and agencies (many programs cross agency jurisdictions), thus making performance 
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reporting more difficult. In this regard there is incompatibility between PART and 
GPRA. PART evaluates programs while GPRA assesses agencies – and these entities 
are defined in different ways. This is confusing to those under evaluation. A third 
criticism was that while OMB provided some feedback on their assessment of 
questionnaire responses and desired improvements in program performance, more 
information of this type was needed. Further, some program officials indicated they 
wished to collect more data but were prevented from doing so by various rules, 
including the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act, and OMB insistence that 
they cut down the number of different data elements to be measured and reported. 
Finally, program staff reported the appearance of an inverse relationship between 
effectiveness ratings and budget decisions, i.e., better was not necessarily richer. 
Testimony to Congress by David Walker, the Controller General of the U.S. 
government, and comments by representatives of the General Accounting Office, the 
Offices of the Inspectors General and members of Congress indicate that important 
institutional observers, including the key oversight committees of Congress, have 
reviewed OMB assessment of executive programs and management practices for the FY 
2003 and 2004 budgets. Through FY 2003 numerous entities, including the U.S. 
Comptroller General, were cautiously supportive of administration efforts (Walker, 
2001, 2002). 
GAO was very specific in stating that it had reviewed favorably the criteria 
supporting PART and OMB evaluation of department and agency performance (Posner, 
2002). As noted in the dialogue above, Christopher Mihm of GAO stated that in his 
view the approach and its execution were methodologically sound (Mihm, 2002a/b). 
GAO reviews of performance management from the late 1990s through 2002 have been 
supportive (GAO, 1996a; 1997a; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 2000b, 2001; Mihm, 2002a/b). 
GAO has favored performance measurement to the extent that it recommended in 2002 
that Congress adopt a "Performance Resolution" process to measure and report annually 
on executive agency progress. This approach would function in a manner similar to the 
Budget Resolution process (Posner, 2002). Such support for performance budget review 
(as distinct from broad-scale performance budgeting) may change, but it is clear that 
virtually everyone in the nation's capitol took serious notice of and responded to the 
Bush administration OMB initiatives with performance measurement and results 
reporting linked to budgets. And, it may be anticipated that Congress and the Executive 
branch will continue to be concerned with implementation of the Government 
Performance and Results Act. 
OMB has not used PART to review DOD programs and performance due to the fact 
that it does not conduct an independent analysis of DOD budget requests. Rather, OMB 
shares this task with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, what the use of 
PART combined with the requirements of the CFO Act, GPRA, GMRA and other 
similar requirements means for DOD is that increasingly there is a need for 
measurement and management of performance relative to costs and a greater 
responsibility to achieve improved transparency in internal financial information 
systems and external reporting to the President, OMB and Congress. 
 
FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR DOD TRANSFORMATION 
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It may be observed that no Secretary of Defense can alone manage an enterprise as 
complex as the Department of Defense. And in fact, it is important to point out that in 
the past and presently, input to program and budget decisions in DOD is provided by 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense and staff, the position in DOD that bears a large part of 
the responsibility for actually attempting to manage the DOD. In addition, the Under 
Secretary Comptroller, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Transportation, Logistics, 
and Assistant Secretaries for other OSD functional areas including program analysis and 
evaluation, policy, force management and personnel, legislative affairs, health, reserve 
affairs and others, all provide views and analyses to guide program and budget decision 
making.  
Regarding the future of PPBES as an element of DOD business transformation, despite 
some apparent weaknesses in application, and given the promise of the reforms 
implemented in 2001-2004, it is likely that the system will continue to produce budget 
requests for defense on a regular and reliable schedule. It will continue to provide a 
structured context for policy negotiation and decision making for the service branches and 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It will supply the framework for integrating the 
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments and services and a template 
against which the assessments and recommendations of other defense and security 
agencies may be compared, e.g., those of the National Security Council, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and others.  
Analysis of the manner in which PPBES operates provides a basis for assessing 
criticisms of defense policy setting and budgeting/resource management as well as policy 
and process reform proposals such as those implemented by the Bush administration in the 
early 2000s. We may ask whether the most recent reforms will be permanent and will be 
taken up by succeeding presidential administrations, whether and the extent to which they 
improve planning and budgeting, and what the likelihood is for further PPBES reform. 
Any administration in office in 2005 and beyond will need to have confidence that the 
defense resource decision system used by DOD can match the requirements of an 
environment in which the U.S. continues to wage a long-term world war on terrorism 
while responding to the inevitable contingencies that arise continuously to confront 
national defense resource planning and budgeting.  
While Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and his staff, and the military department 
secretaries have made significant PPBES changes, much of the process still operates now 
as it did under previous administrations. However, because the new processes authorized 
in 2003 are still under implementation, we must wait to see whether this most recent round 
of change may be termed comprehensive rather than incremental as has typified reform 
under various administrations prior to 2001. 
From this perspective it must be observed that the task of defense resource planning 
and budgeting is part managerial and part political. Thus, from our perspective, no amount 
of budget process, PPBES or business process transformation reforms will reconcile the 
different value systems and funding priorities for national defense and security represented 
by opposing political parties, nor will it eliminate the budgetary influence of special 
interest politics. Value conflict was evident in the early 1980s when public support 
combined with strong Presidential will and successful budget strategy produced 
unprecedented peacetime growth in the defense budget. And despite the implementation of 
deficit control reforms since 1985, constituent and special interest pressures made it 
difficult for Congress and the DOD to realign the defense budget. While we applaud the 
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changes made in 2001-2004, reform of defense budgeting process does not necessarily 
mean that producing a budget for national defense politically will be much easier in the 
future than it has been in the past. Threat perception and assessment, and politics drive the 
defense budget, not the budget process itself (McCaffery and Jones, 2004).  
We also may observe that a sequence of annual budget increases for national defense 
in the early and mid-2000s have not brought relief to many accounts within the DOD 
budget. At the same time, requirements of fighting the war on terrorism have intensified 
the use of DOD assets and the costs of military operations. Because the need for major 
asset renewal (reconstitution) has been postponed for too long, new appropriations have 
gone and will go in the future largely to pay for new weapons system acquisition, and for 
war fighting in battles against terrorism. What this means is that accounts such as those for 
Operations and Maintenance for all branches of the armed services will continue to be 
under pressure and budget instability and restraint will remain a way of life for much of 
DOD. This places a heavy burden on DOD leadership, analysts and resource process 
participants to achieve balance in all phases of defense budgeting and resource 
management. It is exactly such pressure that leads to one of the most challenging barriers 
to transformation; convincing the warfighter that it is worth his or her time and precious 
appropriated funds to invest in transformation of financial management systems. Most 
warfighters simply do not have the time, or inclination, to focus on reforming their 
business systems and the argument must be compelling and in terms of impact on their 
operations. Mr. Jimaye Sones, Comptroller of the Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA), may have stated it best when saying “five dollars saved by cleaning up the 
accounts payable system (for example), means five (additional) dollars that goes to the 
warfighter (Defense Finance 2005). That said, it becomes clear that while many defense 
and government officials publicly state there are hundreds of millions of dollars that can 
likely be saved annually by reforming our finance and accounting systems, the warfighter 
simply can no longer ignore or fail to support such transformation efforts. They must 
however, also ensure they no longer continue to support the thousands of duplicative and 
unreliable ‘legacy’ systems that still exist throughout the department. That’s not to say, as 
some have advocated, that the DOD should create a single defense-wide system. What we 
suggest here is that there is clearly low-hanging fruit that, when harvested, will result in 
better funding on the front lines and ultimately improved support to the warfighter. In fact 
general John W. Handy, USAF, (former) Commanding General of the U.S. Transportation 
Command captured the situation most clearly when saying “there’s rotting fruit on the 
ground that must first be addressed.” Handy is a well-known transformational leader 
within the DOD who aggressively went after systems redundancy within his world-wide 
command. 
With respect to transformation initiatives beyond improved financial management 
systems and processes and PPBES implementation, considerable change is in progress as 
explained in this paper. In the area of acquisition and logistics, transformation to what is 
termed spiral (continuous and simultaneous) and "sense and respond logistics" processes is 
underway. Improving information technology for management of inventory systems in real 
time to permit managers to know how much and where material is located on a worldwide 
basis also has been undertaken and is fully operational in the Air Force. In information 
technology, network centric combat information systems are under development in all of 
the military services. Such systems coordinate various types of data to a single command 
point in real time to improve the ability to see and manage military operations. 
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Applications of network centric IT in the area of business management may be the next 
step, although it is costly. However, it is one approach to coordination of decision making 
in flatter, network types of organization (i. e., hyperarchies) rather than through traditional 
bureaucratic forms of organizing to solve complex and sometimes "wicked" problems 
(Jones and Thompson, 1999; Roberts, 2000). Given the vital importance of information 
technology it is essential for DOD to address the knowledge, skills and abilities of its 
workforce to fully leverage the potential of IT and other business management methods. 
These and the other initiatives identified in this paper are only a sample of the many 
transformational measures currently under some degree of implementation and 
experimentation in DOD. Given the progression from the industrial age to the age of 
technology in an increasingly global commercial marketplace, capitalization on new 
technologies is a key part of transformation to create "knowledge warriors" for significant 
battlefield advantage. Most of these initiatives are not under implementation independent 
of budgets and cost accountability -- virtually all are expected to reduce costs while cutting 
cycle time with either no diminution of quality of service to customers or improvement of 
quality. The business models and plans developed for these initiatives are mirrored on 
business processes tested and used in the private sector. Transformation also stresses 
continuous learning and the creation of self-learning organizations that can observe and 
orient themselves more quickly to new threat environments, then make decisions and take 
action to learn more quickly by trial and error in a cycle of restructuring, reengineering, 
reinvention, realignment and rethinking both means and objectives (Jones and Thompson, 
1999). Further, critical issues related to change management, organizational culture, 
organizational design and appropriate institutional alliances are raised whenever DOD 
reform is significant. 
Overall, the major challenge facing DOD in the period 2004-2008 is how to continue 
to modernize the fighting forces and continue the pace of business transformation while 
paying the high price of waging the war on terrorism. In essence, what DOD must fund 
and support in the short-term must be traded-off against longer-term investments to 
improve both business management efficiency and force readiness. Given this dilemma, 
key business management challenges faced by DOD leadership in the next decade include 
the following:  
 
• How will DOD business transformation keep pace and be coordinated with the 
transformation of military affairs?  
• How will DOD re-capitalize the force structure within limited budgets? 
• How can DOD acquisition and procurement incorporate new technologies while 
producing and fielding war fighting and support assets more quickly, especially 
given tight budgets in the foreseeable future? 
• How will new cyber-management technologies and methods (e.g., net-centric 
warfare systems) be advanced within the limits of resource constraints? 
• How will DOD manage the transition of logistics support (e.g., toward spiral 
logistics) to the new environment of the war on terrorism?  
• How will DOD improve its accounting and financial management systems to 
enable analysis of performance and results related to costs, and provide the basis 
for better internal and external reporting? 
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These and other challenges face DOD officials in the next four years. 
 
Note: The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions to writing this paper made 
by Naval Postgraduate School colleagues Dean of the School of Business and Public 
Policy Douglas A. Brook, Professor Jerry L. McCaffery, Professor Keith Snider, 
Lieutenant Commander Phillip Candreva, Professor Nancy Roberts and Susan Higgins. 
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NOTES
1. DOD is the largest government employer except for the Postal Service. Changes 
to HR practices in defense are observed critically throughout the federal 
government for potential government-wide applicability. In addition, personnel 
system reform authority similar to that authorized for DOD was provided by 
Congress to the Department of Homeland Security and is under wide scrutiny. 
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